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The 2001 Patriot Act chipped away financial privacy protections by allowing law enforcement 
authorities easier access to bank customer records.  Under the Patriot Act, federal authorities may 
access customer records by issuing formal subpoena-like requests under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) or informal national security letters (NSLs) to banks while prohibiting 
notice to any affected customers.  However, the 2006 revisions to the Patriot Act permit banks to 
challenge FISA requests and NSLs in federal court before releasing customer records.  While the 
Act does not require banks to make these challenges on behalf of their customers, this Paper will 
argue that the contracts banks sign with their customers – interpreted in light of the banking 
tradition of confidentiality and the current regime of federal and state privacy protections – 
obligate banks to review government requests for customer records and file challenges when 
appropriate.  Furthermore, I will argue that banks and customers should be able to enter into 
contracts explicitly obligating banks to challenge FISA requests and NSLs, and that such 
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On March 9, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into effect the USA Patriot 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (hereinafter “Reauthorized Patriot Act”).1  
Among the many subtle modifications of the USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act of 
2001 (hereinafter “Patriot Act of 2001” or “original Patriot Act”) was a small nod to financial 
privacy – a seeming check on the government’s power to obtain bank records without providing 
customers with notice or opportunity for a hearing.  Although the Reauthorized Patriot Act still 
allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to request the production of customers’ books 
and records from financial institutions, a new provision allows the recipient institution to 
challenge these requests.2  Whether this concession will channel an era of enlarged customer 
privacy rights wholly depends on whether financial institutions will seize this opportunity to 
defend their customers’ records from intrusive government searches.  
 In this paper, I argue that this newly created right of banks to challenge law enforcement 
inquiries should be construed as a duty rather than a privilege: once empowered, banks are 
obliged to screen requests for records and file petitions in opposition, at least under certain 
circumstances. Although the text of the Reauthorized Patriot Act does not explicitly create 
enforceable rights for customers, its provisions do not operate in a vacuum.  Instead, the banks 
are confronted with exogenous sources of obligations that should inform their decision of 
whether to exercise this newly granted option of challenging law enforcement inquiries.  
                                                 
1 President Signs USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Office of the Press Secretary (March 9, 
2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060309-4.html. 
2 Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations, 50 U.S.C. § 
1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (“A person receiving a production order may challenge the legality of that order by filing a 
petition with the pool established by section 1803(e)(1) of this title.”). 
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Although Supreme Court precedent indicates that customers enjoy only limited constitutional 
protection for privacy rights in financial information voluntarily conveyed to banks,3 a 
patchwork of federal statutory schemes speak to the importance of protecting financial 
information from unwarranted distribution.4  These federal rights are thickened by state 
constitutional and statutory protections.5  Furthermore, customers are endowed with contractual 
rights from the arrangements they enter into with the financial institutions to which they reveal 
private and sensitive information.  These rights are embedded both in the privacy agreements 
signed by banks and their customers and in the expectations created by the nature of the 
relationship and the customs of the banking industry.6  
 In addition, I propose that banks and customers could explicitly contract to require banks 
to challenge law enforcement inquiries including subpoenas through clear duty-creating 
contractual language.  I will propose feasible terms and explore the costs of following through on 
this obligation given the frequency of law enforcement inquiries and costs of raising petitions.  
Finally, I will consider whether there would be market demand for these additional privacy 
protections.  
II. Reauthorized Patriot Act  
 
In passing the Patriot Act of 2001, “Congress set certain more controversial provisions to 
sunset at the end of 2005, at which time Congress would be able to use the experience of the 
intervening four years to devise what changes might be necessary.”7  Hence, Congress 
                                                 
3 See infra Sec. III.A. 
4 See infra Sec. III.B. 
5 See infra Subsec. III.B.3. 
6 See infra Sec. III.C. 
7 Viet D. Dinh & Wendy J. Keefer, FISA & the PATRIOT Act: A Look Back & A Look Forward, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. 
REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, iv (2006); Charles Doyle, USA Patriot Act: Provisions That Expire on December 31, 2005, 
CRS Report for Congress (Jan. 2, 2004) (“Thereafter, the authority remains in effect only as it relates to 
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reconsidered much of the Act in drafting the Reauthorized Patriot Act.  This Paper will focus 
solely on amendments to the original Patriot Act which implicated financial privacy in the 
investigative context. 
A. Access to records under Amendments to FISA 
As discussed above, the Reauthorized Patriot Act permits banks to challenge government 
requests for customer records.  The statutory authorization for this newly conferred power comes 
from amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which gives the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation the power to issue confidential requests for financial records.  Notably, 
Congress originally passed FISA in 1978 to bring greater Congressional oversight to 
counterterrorism operations.  The Act, which reflected a concern that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”), Central Investigative Agency (“CIA”), and Department of Defense 
(“DoD”) had abused their powers during the preceding decades, constituted a departure from the 
independence that agencies charged with protecting national security had originally enjoyed.8  In 
particular, FISA set boundaries on the use of electronic surveillance and subjected 
counterintelligence activities to judicial supervision.  Under the FISA framework, FBI agents 
were permitted to conduct electronic searches and physical searches only after using information 
gathered by less intrusive techniques to satisfy the probable cause standard.9   
FISA not only reined in the previously unchecked authority of these agencies by statute, 
but also spurred societal awareness of the tenuous balance between the powers granted to law 
                                                                                                                                                             
foreign intelligence investigations begun before sunset or to offenses or potential offenses begun or occurring before 
that date.”). 
8 Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A Practical History of the USA 
PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NATIONAL SEC. L. & POL’Y 37, 40 (2005).  (“The revelation of abuses by the FBI, 
CIA, and DOD during the 1960s and 1970s, however, prompted Congress to bring counterintelligence activities 
under a higher degree of regulation.”). 
9 Id. (e.g., interviews, publicly available information and “surveillance in areas where no reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists”). 
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enforcement and the protections retained for civil liberties.  As Michael J. Woods, the former 
chief of the FBI's National Security Law Unit and the Principal Legal Advisor to the National 
Counterintelligence Executive, reflects:  “One legacy of this period of regulation was an 
enduring concern that the tools available to counterintelligence should not be used to subvert the 
constitutional protections of criminal law.”  To address this concern, FISA created “a ‘wall,’ 
built of legal and policy requirements and reinforced by culture, that separated counter-
intelligence officers from criminal investigators.” 10   
This “wall” lasted until 2001, when it was dismantled by the Patriot Act of 2001.  The 
Patriot Act amended FISA to allow the FBI to request individual financial records in the course 
of antiterrorism investigations and prohibited financial institutions from notifying their 
customers of any such requests.11  This provision was among the most contentious extensions of 
federal law enforcement authority in the original Patriot Act.  As Woods, speculates, “Perhaps no 
provision of the Act has generated more controversy than § 215, which authorizes the FBI to 
seek a court order compelling the production of ‘any tangible things’ relevant to certain 
counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations.”12  
Under section 215, the FBI can obtain customer financial records by applying to a district 
judge for an order requiring the financial institution to produce tangible things including 
records.13  In reviewing the application, the judge must determine whether the application meets 
the statutory criteria, namely a factual showing of reasonable grounds, compliance with so-called 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a) (2006); President Signs USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, supra note 1 
(“Before the Patriot Act, criminal investigators were often separated from intelligence officers by a legal and 
bureaucratic wall.”). 
12 Woods, supra note 8, at 37.  
13 In reviewing a request for records under § 1861(a), judges use the criteria of 50 USC § 1803(a) (2006). 
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minimization procedures, and general lawfulness.14  If the judge concludes that the application 
satisfies these requirements, the judge shall enter an ex parte order approving the release of 
tangible things.15  The production order imposes a duty of nondisclosure on the party who is 
requested to release the records.  The duty of nondisclosure is mitigated by a few narrowly 
construed statutory exceptions, namely permission to speak to others as necessary to comply 
with the order and to a lawyer in order to obtain legal advice.16 
Tucked into the Reauthorized Patriot Act is a provision empowering the institution from 
which records are solicited to challenge the production order:  
The provision also expressly provides for a judicial review process that 
authorizes a specified pool of FISA court judges to review a 215 order that 
has been challenged.  The provision requires high-level approval, and 
specific congressional reporting, of requests for certain sensitive 
categories of records, such as library, bookstore, tax return, firearms sales, 
educational, and medical records.17 
 
While providing financial and other record-keeping institutions with this power to challenge 
subpoenas, the Reauthorized Patriot Act does not explicitly require these empowered institutions 
to exercise this option.  On the contrary, the Act pronounces:  “A person who, in good faith, 
produces tangible things under an order pursuant to this section shall not be liable to any other 
person for such production.”18  However, the language is not necessarily determinative on the 
question of institutional duty or liability to customers.  Even if banks may not be held liable for 
their actual disclosures, their failure to challenge the request in light of the background system of 
                                                 
14 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(B), (C)(i) (2006) (clarifying the standard of judicial review as very narrow); Conference 
Report accompanying H.R. 3199, at 91 (Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=f:hr333.109.pdf (discussing section 106). 
15 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1). 
16 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1)(A), (B). 
17 Conference Report accompanying H.R. 3199, supra note 14, at 91 (discussing section 106); § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) 
(“The person receiving the production order may challenge its legality by filing a petition with the pool of 
designated district judges established by § 1803(e)(1).”). 
18 50 U.S.C. § 1861(e) (2006). 
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obligations and expectations preceding the Patriot Act may be an independent basis for a 
procedural injury. 
B. National Security Letters  
 
Along with the formal mechanism described above, investigative agencies may also issue 
National Security Letters (NSLs), which do not require pre-enforcement approval by a judicial 
officer.  Under the NSL process, the agency director may request a financial institution to 
produce records by “certif[ying] in writing to the financial institution that such records are 
sought for foreign counter intelligence purposes to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities.”19  Congress granted agencies charged with protecting 
national security the power to issue NSLs to allow counterintelligence agents to obtain 
transactional information about investigative suspects.20  When Congress first permitted these 
agencies to issue NSLs, it abstained from requiring the recipients of the letters to comply.  Until 
1978, it was left to the discretion of the institution whether to release the requested records on a 
case by case basis.  In 1978, Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act, which 
mandated that financial institutions comply with NSL requests for records.  However, the RFPA 
only made compliance mandatory for the narrow set of record requests “where there are specific 
and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or entity to whom the information 
sought pertains is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”21  In 1993, this 
requirement was reduced to “a connection with a suspected intelligence officer or suspected 
                                                 
19 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2006). 
20 Woods, supra note 8, at 41 (defining transactional information as “information that broadly describes information 
that documents financial or communications transactions without necessarily revealing the substance of those 
transactions,” e.g., records of bank accounts and money transfers). 
21 S. Rep. No. 99-307, at 19 (1986). 
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terrorist or other indication of spying.”22  The 2001 Patriot Act promulgated an even more lenient 
standard, requiring only “relevance to an investigation of international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.”23 
In contrast to the FISA requests described above in Section II.A, the NSL issuance 
process involves few procedural safeguards to balance individual privacy against competing 
governmental interests.  In a recent journalistic investigation uncovering the widespread use of 
the letters, Eric Lichtblau reported in the New York Times that “[a]s an investigative tool, the 
letters present relatively few hurdles; they can be authorized by supervisors rather than a 
court.”24  Furthermore, there is no formal mechanism such as judicial review before a request is 
issued to assure that requests are narrowly tailored and limited to the records of those individuals 
for whom there is some reasonable basis for suspicion.  Lichtblau observed that the “[p]assage of 
the Patriot Act in October 2001 lowered the standard for issuing the letters, requiring only that 
the documents sought be ‘relevant’ to an investigation and allowing records requests for more 
peripheral figures, not just targets of an inquiry.”25 
Financial institutions are granted an opportunity to challenge NSLs by a process parallel 
to that for requests under FISA.  The recipient of the request for records may petition the district 
court to modify or set aside the nondisclosure requirement associated with the request.26  In 
                                                 
22 Dinh, supra note 7, at xx (citing 18 USC § 2709(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003)). 
23 Id.; Jeffrey Rosen, Who’s Watching the FBI?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 15, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/magazine/15wwlnlede.t.html?ref=magazine (“The F.B.I. could issue the letters 
only if senior officials in Washington had a factual basis for believing that the records pertained to a suspected spy 
or terrorist. But the Patriot Act diluted these requirements, allowing F.B.I. field agents to issue the orders on their 
own say-so merely by asserting that they were “relevant” to a terrorism investigation.”). 
24 Eric Lichtblau & Mark Mazzetti, Military Expands Intelligence Role in US, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/14/washington/14spy.html?ex=1169874000&en=118fa651b736ef03&ei=5070; 
Rosen, supra note 23 (“In March, a report by the inspector general of the Justice Department described ‘widespread 
and serious misuse’ of national-security letters after the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001 significantly expanded the 
F.B.I.’s authority to issue them: between 2003 and 2005, he concluded, the F.B.I. issued more than 140,000 
national-security letters, many involving people with no obvious connections to terrorism.”). 
25 Lichtblau, supra note 24. 
26 Judicial review of requests for information, 18 U.S.C. § 3511 (2006). 
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addition, the Committee Report accompanying the Reauthorized Patriot Act emphasized that the 
reworded provision authorizing bank challenges “makes explicit that the recipient of a national 
security letter (NSL) may consult with an attorney and challenge the NSL in court.”27  In 
evaluating such a challenge, the Court’s standard of review is narrow and deferential:  the court 
may set aside the nondisclosure requirement or otherwise modify the NSL only if it finds that 
there is no reason to believe that such changes would endanger national security.  Even in light 
of such a finding by the court, a high-ranking FBI official may “certify” that the disclosure 
would pose a danger, and this certification will be treated as conclusive unless the court finds 
that it was made in bad faith.28  If the entity does not comply with the request for production 
following an unsuccessful challenge, the Attorney General may invoke the district court to issue 
an order requiring compliance.  If the entity fails to obey the order, it may be held liable for 
contempt of court.29 
The availability of pre-enforcement judicial review of NSLs is essential to the 
constitutionality of the process.  As in the case of administrative subpoenas, constitutionality “is 
predicated on the availability of a neutral tribunal to determine, after the subpoena is issued, 
whether the subpoena actually complies with the Fourth Amendment’s demands.”30  An 
administrative subpoena regime would not be constitutional if judicial review was not available 
“prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply.”31  In 2004, the federal district court for the 
                                                 
27 Conference Report accompanying H.R. 3199, supra note 14, at 95 (explaining that the court may modify or set 
aside the nondisclosure requirement only if it ascertains that there is no reason to believe that disclosure may harm 
national security; interfere with criminal, counterintelligence, or counterterrorism investigations; interfere with 
diplomatic relations; or endanger the life or physical safety of a person.”). 
28 12 U.S.C. § 3414(b)(2) (2006). 
29 18 U.S.C. § 3511(c) (2006). 
30 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  There are only a smattering of recent cases 
challenging NSLs because “[w]ith no means to enforce or to quash NSLs and with NSLs being issued primarily to 
third parties with little reason to refuse compliance, challenges to the issuance of these administrative subpoenas 
only occurred after the publicity they garnered with the PATRIOT Act.” Dinh, supra note 7, at xxix. 
31 Id. 
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Southern District of New York, in a decision upheld by the Second Circuit, held that the 
statutory provision allowing the FBI to issue NSLs to internet service providers (ISPs) but 
denying pre-enforcement review to the recipients was unconstitutional.32  The ISPs argued that 
non-disclosure provision effectively prevented them from accessing the courts, because they 
would need to divulge the receipt of an NSL in order to litigate.  The court agreed, concluding 
that “what is, in practice, an implicit obligation of automatic compliance with NSLs violates the 
Fourth Amendment right to judicial access.”33  Courts have similarly rejected law enforcement 
processes compelling libraries to disclose borrower records without permitting pre-enforcement 
challenges.34  As discussed above, the amended NSL provision in the Reauthorized Patriot Act 
allows recipients of the letters to challenge their issuance.35  Because the Reauthorized Patriot 
Act added provisions explicitly permitting challenges and consultation with an attorney, the 
Second Circuit vacated the portion of the district court’s holding that the NSL process was 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.36 
                                                 
32 Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the original § 2709 was unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment because it denied pre-enforcement review and under the First Amendment because “it operated 
as a content-based prior restraint on speech that was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest”); see also Gonzales v. Doe II, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005) (granting a motion for a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the government from enforcing the gag order imposed on the recipient of an NSL 
under § 2709(c) in holding that the recipient had demonstrated irreparable harm from the suppression of speech).  
33 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 505 (reasoning that it would be naïve to think that “NSLs, given their 
commandeering warrant, do anything short of coercing all but the most fearless NSL recipient into immediate 
compliance and secrecy”). 
34 Doe v. Gonzales, Opinion in Chambers (Oct. 7, 2005) (Ginsberg, J.), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nationalsecurityletters/080306ginsburg_opinion_sealed.pdf (providing that requests for 
library records are unconstitutional for the same reasons as internet service provider records in Doe v. Gonzales, 449 
F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006)); compare Jay M. Zitter, Constitutionality of National Security Letters Issued Pursuant to 
18 USCA § 2709, 2006 ALR Fed. 2d 3 (noting that the NSLs held unconstitutional in the internet service provider 
and library contexts are different than those issued to financial institutions). 
35 Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).  
36 Id. at 419 (also vacating and remanding the First Amendment portion of Doe v. Ashcroft in response to the 
legislative changes). 
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While Congress was drafting the Patriot Act of 2001, the government originally sought 
administrative subpoena power, but received only the authority to issue letters under § 215.37  
Although NSLs are like administrative subpoenas in that no judicial approval is required for 
authorization, they do not come with a self-executing enforcement mechanism.38  Rather, if the 
recipient of the letter does not comply, the government must approach a federal court for 
enforcement.39  This suggests that Congress intended the NSL process to confer only limited 
authority to government agencies and wished to give courts a role in balancing law enforcement 
power with personal liberties. 
C. Non-madatory NSLs 
 
In addition to the national security letters authorized by the Patriot Act, the U.S. military 
and the CIA have begun issuing “non-mandatory” national security letters as an extension of 
their domestic intelligence-gathering operations.  The letters are mostly issued in connection 
with military or criminal investigations.  However, the military and CIA not only lack the 
explicit statutory authority to issue NSLs granted to the FBI, but, as a former U.S. Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement notes, “[n]otably Congress has 
previously refused to provide these agencies with the authority to subpoena such documents, on 
the basis that the FBI already had this authority and that it was a bad idea to get the CIA and 
Defense Department to engage in domestic spying.”40  In addition, as Elizabeth Parker, a former 
                                                 
37 H.R. Rep. No. 107-236 (Part I), at 61. Compare Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (providing 
that the court must enforce an administrative subpoena unless it is “plainly . . . irrelevant to any lawful purpose of 
the agency”). 
38 Woods points out the distinction between 21 USC § 876(c), which provides for judicial enforcement of 
administrative subpoenas, and 12 USC § 3414(a)(5), which fails to provide for judicial enforcement of NSLs. 
Woods, supra note 8, at 61; see also Beryl A. Howell, Surveillance Powers in the USA PATRIOT Act: How Scary 
Are They?, 76 PA. BAR. ASSOC. Q. 12, 18 (2005).  
39 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
40 Jonathan Winer, CIA, Military Reveal Acquisition of Domestic Bank Records (Jan. 14, 2007),  
http://www.counterterrorismblog.org/2007/01/ (“Given that the FBI already had this authority and has been using it 
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general counsel at both the National Security Agency and the CIA, has observed, these letters 
contrast with the “strong tradition of not using our military for domestic law enforcement” and 
signify a “mov[e] into territory where historically they have not been authorized or presumed to 
be operating.”41  In general, courts have also reasoned that government surveillance in domestic 
affairs is entitled to greater constitutional protection than in the foreign intelligence context.42  
Despite their questionable validity, officials estimate that thousands of these letters have been 
disseminated in the past few years.43  
Although these requests are admittedly non-mandatory (in contrast to FISA requests or 
NSLs issued by the FBI), journalistic investigations have revealed that “[b]anks, credit card 
companies and other financial institutions receiving the letters usually have turned over 
documents voluntarily, allowing investigators to examine the financial assets and transactions of 
American military personnel and civilians.”44  For example, a noncompulsory NSL was used to 
solicit and obtain the financial records of a Muslim chaplain at Guantanamo Bay, a U.S. citizen 
who was falsely suspected of supporting the terrorists.45  Such disclosure raises serious civil 
liberties issues:  “[W]hen the person under investigation is an American the justification for 
                                                                                                                                                             
at the rate of some 9000 times per year, it is not clear why the CIA and Defense Department have needed it. The 
initial efforts to justify it raise more questions than they answer.”). But see Lichtblau, supra note 24 (“Government 
lawyers say the legal authority for the Pentagon and the C.I.A. to use national security letters in gathering domestic 
records dates back nearly three decades and, by their reading, was strengthened by the antiterrorism law known as 
the USA Patriot Act.”)  
41 Lichtblau, supra note 24 (quoting Elizabeth Parker). 
42 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (“Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot 
properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the 
Executive Branch.”). 
43 Lichtblau, supra note 24. 
44 Id. 
45 Karen DeYoung, Officials: Pentagon Probed Finances, WASH. POST. Jan. 14, 2007, at A12,  available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/13/AR2007011301486_pf.html; see also Laura 
Parker, The Ordeal of Chaplain Yee, USA TODAY, May 16, 2004, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-05-16-yee-cover_x.htm. 
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doing this without the normal procedural protections of a law enforcement investigation is hard 
to understand.”46 
Congress has not granted the authority to issue mandatory NSLs to the CIA or military.  
The fact that the military and CIA are permitted to issue non-mandatory NSLs in a particular 
context does not mean that Congress would grant them the authority to issue a mandatory NSL 
under the same set of circumstances.  Historically, Congress has coupled granting the authority 
to issue mandatory NSLs with other limitations on the breadth of this authority.  When Congress 
began to allow the FBI to issue mandatory NSLs, the Senate Intelligence Committee “concluded 
that the FBI’s mandatory NSL power should be more limited in scope than what the FBI had 
been seeking under voluntary NSL arrangements.”47  Furthermore, that Congress has given the 
FBI the right to issue mandatory NSLs does not imply that Congress would willingly give the 
same authority to other federal agencies.  Indeed, financial privacy statutes now prohibit the 
transfer of customer information across agencies, implying that Congress wishes to limit which 
agencies have access to particular forms of information.48  
 
III. The rights of depositors in information conveyed to financial 
institutions 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and explicitly mentions the right to be secure in one’s “papers.”49  However, the Supreme Court 
                                                 
46 Winer, supra note 40. 
47 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (emphasis in original) (citing S. Rep. No. 99-307, at 
19-20). 
48 E.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000); Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial 
Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1263, 1274 (noting that the Privacy Act has effectively “succeeded in preventing the 
creation of the omnivorous, unified federal database”). 
49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
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has not interpreted the Fourth Amendment as protecting information voluntarily conveyed to a 
third party.50  However, Congress passed several statutes heightening customer protections by 
restricting the circumstances under which banks can release financial information.51  These 
federal enactments and complementary state regimes enumerate express rights and obligations, 
which further thicken the historically rich set of duties that banks owe their customers.  Along 
with the federal and state legal regimes governing financial privacy, historic notions of privacy 
in financial information inform the reasonable expectations of customers, shaping their 
interpretations of institutional privacy policies and the perception of the bank-customer 
relationship.52 
A. Limited constitutional protections 
 
The bare language of the Fourth Amendment – particularly its inclusion of “papers” –  
might be construed to protect bank depositors from disclosure of their financial information.  
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment narrowly and afforded little 
privacy protection to bank customers in their books and records.  
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court declined to infer a general right to privacy 
from the Fourth Amendment, reasoning instead that the contours of privacy rights were generally 
to be determined by the individual states.53  However, the Court reasoned that the Fourth 
Amendment required law enforcement agents to comply with the “procedure of antecedent 
justification” before engaging in searches and seizures.54  In Katz, government agents 
electronically listened to and recorded the petitioner’s calls made from a telephone booth.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”) (emphasis added). 
50 E.g., U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
51 E.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1978). 
52 Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. App. 1979).  
53 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
54 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. 
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Court held that while the government agents exercised restraint in narrowly tailoring their 
surveillance, their actions were nonetheless improper because the agents failed to first obtain 
judicial authorization.55  Essential to this outcome was the Court’s recognition that the Fourth 
Amendment protected “people, not places” and hence applied to intangible as well as physical 
property.56  In addition, the Katz Court focused on whether the individual had intended to make 
the information public rather than where the individual had chosen to store the information.57  By 
doing so, Katz “underscored the crucial role that disclosed by nonpublic information plays in 
modern society.”58  The reasoning of the Katz decision left open the possibility that customer 
financial records might be protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
However, in Miller, the Court closed this possibility by holding that the search and 
seizure of bank records does not violate the Fourth Amendment because “the depositor takes the 
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to 
the Government.”59  The Court reasoned:   
“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, 
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used 
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will 
not be betrayed.”60 
   
                                                 
55 Id. at 356. 
56 Id. at 351. 
57 Id.; see also Andrew DeFillipis, Note, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1102 (2006) (Katz “began to articulate an affirmative right to 
control one’s information by symbolic gestures and mutually recognized norms.”). 
58 Id. at 1103. 
59 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance, 17 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 531, 546 (“Even if a customer inevitably takes a risk that some 
companies and their employees might break such promises, the Supreme Court gave prosecutors something much 
broader: the power to compel the firm to turn over customer information when the firm seeks to honor its 
commitment to presevr confidentiality.”). 
60 Id. (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)). It should be noted, however, that financial 
records, as opposed to opinions about a customer’s financial condition, are not protected under the First 
Amendment. Compare Schonewies v. Dando, 435 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Neb. 1989).  
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As a result, the Court held that the documents copied and seized by the government agents in the 
case were the bank’s business papers and not the petitioner’s private papers, and hence did not 
merit Fourth Amendment protection.61  In deciding not to grant constitutional protection to these 
records, the Court relied on its prior holding in Hoffa v. United States that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect “a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he 
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”62 
Although the Miller decision has effectively closed off constitutional avenues for seeking 
privacy protection for financial records, some lower courts have skirted around the Supreme 
Court’s holding by carving out privacy protections in analogous cases.  For example, in United 
States v. Thomas, the Sixth Circuit held that individuals retained a reasonable expectation in the 
contents of their safety deposit boxes even though the boxes ostensibly belonged to the bank.63 
However, when it comes to financial records per se, it appears that there is little constitutional 
ground on which to argue for the protection of customer privacy in financial records.64 
In the alternative, some courts have reasoned that while customers do not retain Fourth 
Amendment rights in information they voluntarily convey to a bank, the bank itself may be 
entitled to this protection, either from its endogenous privacy interests or through transference 
from the customer.  For example, in finding the earlier NSL process to be unconstitutional, the 
district court for the Southern District of New York reasoned that “many potential NSL 
recipients may have particular interests in resisting an NSL, e.g., because they have contractually 
obligated themselves to protect the anonymity of their subscribers.”65  Some state courts have 
                                                 
61 Miller, 425 U.S. at 345. 
62 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
63 878 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1989). 
64 Cf.  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 602, 603-04 (1977) (“recognize[ing] that in some circumstances the duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosure of data arguably has its roots in the Constitution.”). 
65 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 494. 
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also given weight to banks’ own interest in privacy.  In Louisiana, one bank claimed that 
releasing private consumer financial information without customer consent would not only 
violate the GLBA, but also cause an irreparable injury to the bank, which fear[ed] that it would 
“surely suffer injury to its business reputation when its customers learn that their private 
financial information was divulged to third parties without their consent.”66  The state court 
agreed:  “Once this information has been provided, in contradiction to the dictates of the GLBA, 
there is no monetary relief which could compensate such a loss.”67  Hence, there may still be a 
few constitutional avenues available to require banks to challenge FISAs request or NSLs on 
purely constitutional grounds.  However, this paper’s argument will not take a solely 
constitutional route, as the rights of bank customers are thickened by federal statutory protections 
passed in response to Miller. 
B. Extensive statutory schemes 
  
Although the Supreme Court did not recognize a constitutional right to privacy in one’s 
bank records, Congress may extend individual privacy rights beyond this minimal constitutional 
guarantee.  Congress has been cognizant of its ability to expand privacy protections for personal 
information, noting in House committee report:  “[W]hile the Supreme Court found no 
constitutional right of privacy in financial records, it is clear that Congress may provide 
protection of individual rights beyond that afforded in the Constitution.”68  Congress has used its 
power to provide for some measure of individual control over information ceded to financial 
institutions through a series of legislative enactments over the decades since the Miller 
                                                 
66 Union Planters Bank v. Gavel, 2002 WL 975675, at *2 (E.D. La. May 9, 2002). 
67 Id. at *6. See also California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 US 21, 51 (1974) (“It is true that in a limited 
class of cases this Court has permitted a party who suffered an injury as a result of the operation of law to assert his 
rights even though the sanction of the law was borne by another.”)  
68 H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, at 28 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9304. 
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decision.69  In this section, I will discuss the two statutory schemes most relevant to financial 
privacy in the context of law enforcement inquiries: the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 
and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1998. 
1. Right to Financial Privacy Act 
 
In response to the rescission of financial privacy protection by the Supreme Court in 
Miller, Congress acted to explicitly endow bank customers with statutory protection for  
information exchanged in the course of financial transactions.  In 1978, Congress passed the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), which was “intended to protect the customers of 
financial institutions from unwarranted intrusion into their records while at the same time 
permitting legitimate law enforcement activity.”70  The accompanying House Report specifically 
described the RFPA as an expansion of privacy protections in reaction to Miller: 
The title is a congressional response to the Supreme Court decision 
in United States v. Miller . . . .  The Court did not acknowledge the 
sensitive nature of [financial] records, and instead decided that since the 
records are the “property” of the financial institution, the customer has no 
constitutionally recognizable privacy in them.71 
 
The RFPA prohibits financial institutions from disclosing records without notifying affected 
customers,72 and requires customer consent absent a search warrant, judicial subpoena, or formal 
written request.73  This enactment empowers customers to object when the bank is presented 
                                                 
69 Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 547 (“These state and federal statutes do not provide the full complement of Fourth 
Amendment safeguards . . . . Instead they establish a dense web of accountability provisions, with requirements and 
procedures that differ according to the kind of information concerned and the government’s asserted purpose in 
seeking it.”). 
70 H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, supra note 68, at 28; Edward L. Symons, The Bank-Customer Relation, 100 Banking L.J. 
220, 237 (“In 1978, Congress expressed its determination that, contrary to the majority opinion in Miller, a bank 
customer  has a reasonable expectation of privacy his financial dealings with a bank.”). 
71 H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, supra note 68, at 28. 
72 12 U.S.C. § 3409. 
73 12 U.S.C. § 3404 (customer authorization); § 3406 (search warrant); § 3407 (subpoena); § 3408 (written request). 
When the government subpoenas a customer’s records, the government must also provide a copy of the subpoena to 
the customer and along with a notice specifying the nature of the inquiry, § 3407(2).  
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with an administrative summons or judicial subpoena by filing a motion to quash or applying to 
enjoin the soliciting government agency.74  In addition, banks that violate the RFPA by failing to 
comply with its procedural safeguards may be subject to civil liability to the customer whose 
records were disclosed.75 
However, the RFPA exempts from its procedural requirements investigations related to 
national security, counterterrorism, or foreign intelligence.76  The protections above may be 
bypassed if the government authority certifies to the financial institution that “there may result a 
danger to the national security of the United States, interference with a criminal, 
counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or 
danger to the life or physical safety of any person.”77  Hence, the RFPA expanded customer 
protections in some areas but also remained deferential to the investigative powers of federal law 
enforcement agencies. 
As originally enacted, the RPFA granted the FBI the authority to issue letters requesting 
records, but did not require financial institutions to comply.78  Rather, the Act tracked traditional 
law enforcement procedures which generally require that when the Government seeks financial 
records of bank customers as part of a law enforcement inquiry, it must use formal written 
request such as a subpoena that is reviewable in court or obtain a search warrant.79  In addition, 
the original RFPA required customer notice unless an order delaying notice was issued by a 
judicial officer.  These protections have been chipped away over time.  The RFPA was amended 
in 1987 by the Intelligence Authorization Act “to grant the FBI authority to obtain a customer's 
                                                 
74 Customer challenges, 12 U.S.C. § 3410(a). 
75 Civil penalties, 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a). 
76 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(1). 
77 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(3)(A).  
78 Right to Financial Privacy Act § 1114(a). 
79 Robert T. Palmer & A.T. Darin Palmer, Complying with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 96 BANKING 
L.J. 196, 211 (1979) 
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or entity's records from a financial institution for counterintelligence purposes if . . . there are 
specific and articulable facts giving reasons to believe that the customer or entity is a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power.”80  However, despite this change in the evidentiary 
standard, the RFPA still reflects the importance of financial privacy as reaffirmed by Congress. 
2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act  
 
On November 12, 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) to 
modernize the regulation of financial institutions.81  One component of this modernization 
package was a reinvigoration of the central tenet of financial privacy.  The GLBA announced:  
“It is the policy of Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing 
obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of 
those customers’ nonpublic personal information.”82  Like the RFPA, the GLBA requires 
financial institutions to notify customers whose records have been solicited and to provide an 
opportunity for affected customers to opt out of the disclosure.  However, it also contains a 
judicial process exception, allowing the financial institution to disclose personal information “to 
comply with Federal, state or local laws . . . subpoena or summons . . . judicial process or 
government regulatory authorities . . . or other purposes as authorized by law.”83  Unlike the 
RFPA, the GLBA is focused on administrative oversight rather than private rights enforcement:  
Significantly, the new federal law does not empower consumers to act to 
ensure their own interests in such matters.  Rather, the law establishes a 
procedural device and overlapping regulatory supervisory enforcement 
mechanisms to identify and correct abusive policies and practices rather 
                                                 
80 H.R. Rep. No. 99-690(I), at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5327, 5341. 
81 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999), Pub.L. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999). 
82 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a). 
83 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8); see, e.g., Ex parte Mutual Savings Co., 899 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 2004) (holding that trial 
court could order disclosure of customer info during civil discovery as part of GLBA’s judicial-process exception). 
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than to remedy or resolve individual rights affected by specific 
infractions.84 
 
Although the GLBA does not grant any new rights to depositors in the face of law enforcement 
inquiries, its legislative history provides an interesting window into the intent of Congress to 
preserve and strengthen the relationship between financial institutions and their customers. 
Industry groups opposed the GLBA’s tightened restrictions on the sharing of customer 
information.  However, Congress was persuaded by testimony that customers consider the 
information they reveal to financial institutions to be private.  The Honorable Edward Gramlich, 
a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, testified: 
Control of information about ourselves is a fundamental means by which 
we manage our relationships with each other. The feeling that financial 
information should be private has deep historic roots, and bankers and 
customers have long viewed their business relationship as involving a high 
degree of trust which could be threatened by violation of privacy.85 
 
Furthermore, Mr. Gramlich considered whether banking practices governing the treatment of 
customer information were evolving too quickly for customers or market forces to adjust to 
them.  In light of these rapid changes and lagging responses, Gramlich urged Congress to “strike 
the appropriate balance between these competing interests.”86  Congress responded with the 
GLBA, which improved the ability of customers to exercise control over the dissemination of 
information contained in their bank records. 
                                                 
84 David W. Roderer, Tentative Steps Toward Financial Privacy, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 209, 212-13 (2000); see 
also 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (requiring agencies to “establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions subject to 
their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to insure the security and 
confidentiality of customer records and . . . to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records”). 
85 Statement of Edward Gramlich, Member, Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System, House Banking 
Subcommittee Hearing (July 21, 1999), at 129 (available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba58308.000/hba58308_1.HTM); see also Indiv. References Serv. 
Grp., Inc. v. FTC., 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 18-20 (D. D.C. 2001) (providing an extensive discussion of legislative history 
of the GLBA). 
86 Id. 
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3. State constitutional & statutory protections 
 
Even when interpreting the Fourth Amendment narrowly with regard to financial privacy, 
the Supreme Court has cautioned:  “Our holding, of course, does not affect the State’s power to 
impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it 
chooses to do so.”87  State courts in a multitude of jurisdictions have accepted this as an open 
invitation to distinguish the applicability of Miller when they encounter more protective state 
regimes.88  For example, the Colorado Supreme Court noted:  “Miller limits our application of 
the Fourth Amendment . . . but it does not determine the scope of protection provided to 
individuals in Colorado by the constitution of this state.”89  As scholars have explained: 
For a state court interpreting a state constitution, opinions of the United 
States Supreme Court are like opinions of sister state courts or lower 
federal courts.  One would expect a state court to deal carefully with a 
Supreme Court opinion and to explain forthrightly why it found itself 
constrained to reason differently.  But such a difference in reasoning 
should be no more alarming than the differences which impel one judge to 
dissent from another's opinion, one court to disagree with another, or the 
judges of any court to disagree with a precedent established by their 
predecessors.90 
 
Justice Brennan has encouraged state courts to rise to the challenge of guaranteeing their litigants 
the full panoply of protections arising under their state constitutions.  He cautions:  “[S]tate 
courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal 
Constitution.  State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often 
                                                 
87 Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).  
88 People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 88 (Ill. App. 1983) (“A State may of course set a higher standard of rights than 
the comparable United States constitutional right . . . . Colorado, California and Pennsylvania rejected the rationale 
of Miller and held that there was a privacy right in bank records and consequently there was standing.”); 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 239 A.2d 290, 292 n.2 (Pa. 1968) (“[T]he state has the power to impose standards on 
searches and seizures higher than those required by the Federal Constitution.”).  
89 Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Colo. 1980). 
90 Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than “Adequate” Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 283-84 
(1973) (“While neither binding in a constitutional sense nor precedential in a jurisprudential one, [Supreme Court 
opinions] are entitled to whatever weight their reasoning and intellectual persuasiveness warrant.”). 
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extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law.”91  Indeed, 
Justice Brennan expresses concern that the dramatic expansion of constitutional rights during the 
1960s may have deterred state courts from taking full advantage of state-level guarantees, 
arguing that state-created rights are becoming increasingly important as more recent Supreme 
Court decisions interpret constitutional guarantees of civil liberties more narrowly.92  
Many state courts have analyzed the right to privacy in bank records under Katz instead 
of Miller.93  In doing so, some have explicitly declined to follow Miller out of a belief that it 
“establishes a dangerous precedent, with great potential for abuse.”94  For example, the Colorado 
courts, following the lead of the California courts, applied the “Katz expectation of privacy test 
as a measure of unreasonable seizures under the Colorado constitution” in determining whether a 
customer had the right to challenge a subpoena to the bank for his records.95  In an analogous 
move, the Illinois state courts have reasoned: 
Under Katz, the Fourth Amendment gives protection for an individual's 
reasonable expectation of privacy which is not bound by the location and 
present ownership of the records.  Consequently, the right to privacy is not 
waived by placing these records in the hands of a bank.  The individual 
can still legitimately expect that her financial records will not be subject to 
disclosure.96 
 
However, state constitutional protections of privacy in financial records are typically not 
absolute and the conferred rights are balanced against competing policy concerns.  In upholding 
a subpoena that prevented notice to the customer whose records were solicited, a Florida state 
court noted:  “[T]he bank customers’ right of privacy in bank records, a state constitutional right, 
                                                 
91 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions & the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 
(1977). 
92 Id.  (“The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the 
independent protective force of state law--for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.”). 
93 E.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Ut. 1991). 
94 E.g., Community v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). 
95 Charnes, 612 P.2d at 1120; Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974) 
(relying on Art. I, sec. 13 of the California constitution). 
96 People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 88 (Ill. 1983) (citing Burrows). 
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yields to an investigation of the pari-mutuel industry, which, to be effective, must be conducted 
without notice.”97  However, in so reasoning, the court recognized this case to be an exception to 
the general state constitutional protection of financial privacy.  
 Along with constitutional provisions, many states have enacted statutory schemes that 
provide more robust and particularized protection of financial privacy rights.  For example, 
Louisiana has a statutory scheme which its state courts have interpreted as imbuing banks with a 
duty of confidentiality.  Banks have statutory authority to disclose customer records when faced 
with a subpoena, summons, or court order, but even for these formal inquiries, the affected 
customer must be notified when permitted, and given an opportunity to object in a timely 
manner.  The courts have interpreted this customer protection broadly:  “Thus, although neither 
statute specifically contains any language which expressly creates a cause of action in favor of an 
individual whose records were wrongfully disclosed, we find that these statutes create a duty of 
confidentiality on the part of financial institutions in favor of their customers.”98 
Maryland has a more explicit state regime protecting the rights of bank customers.  The 
Maryland legislature was “[a]pparently disturbed by what it believed to be a trend, out of all 
scotch and notch, among banks and other fiduciary institutions to furnish information without 
compulsion to government agencies”99 and sought to re-emphasize that “the confidential 
relationships between fiduciary institutions and their customers must be preserved and 
protected.”100  In light of its statutory regime, Maryland state courts have interpreted the 
                                                 
97 Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544 (Fla.1985). 
98 Burford v. First Nat. Bank in Mansfield, 557 So.2d 1147, 1151 (La. App. 1990). 
99 Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. App. 1979). 
100 Preamble to 1976 Md. Laws, ch. 252(a)(2). 
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circumstances under which these customer confidences can be breached very narrowly, limiting 
banks to disclosing customer information under lawful court order or with customer consent:101 
We think that a bank depositor in this State has a right to expect that the 
bank will, to the extent permitted by law, treat as confidential, all 
information regarding his account and any transaction relating thereto. 
Accordingly, we hold that, absent compulsion by law, a bank may not 
make any disclosures concerning a depositor's account without the express 
or implied consent of the depositor.102 
 
New Hampshire has a similarly restrictive state statutory scheme, permitting the inspection of 
financial records by law enforcement officials only under a judicial subpoena or summons that 
describes the requested records with sufficient particularity.103  These requirements go beyond 
“minimum constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant.”104  When the state 
statutory requirements are not met, bank customers have standing to challenge any evidence 
obtained without procedural authorization.105 Alabama has also enacted statutes which prohibit 
the disclosure of customer bank records except upon subpoena or court order.106 These state 
enactments not only provide additional safeguards and courses of action for bank customers, but 
underscore the importance of financial privacy in society’s collective consciousness.  
                                                 
101 Suburban, 408 A.2d at 765 (distinguishing the lower court’s jury instruction, which told jurors that banks may 
release confidential information when “a matter of public necessity” as “afford[ing] the Bank more protection than it 
was entitled to receive”). Cf. The robustness of the rights created by these state statutory schemes is most evident by 
a comparison to states lacking such enactments.  For example, the Indiana state courts have rejected the holding of 
Suburban because Indiana lacks a comparable statutory scheme.  In the absence of rights-creating statutory 
language, the Indiana courts have held that “a person does not legitimately expect his affairs with third parties to be 
kept private from law enforcement officers conducting an investigation.” Indiana National Bank v. Chapman, 482 
N.E.2d 474, 481 (Ind. App. 1985) (citing Indiana Bell Telephone v. State, 409 N.E.2d 1089, 1090 (Ind. 1980)) 
(“[B]ank depositors, have taken the risk in revealing their affairs to third parties that the information will be 
conveyed by that person to law enforcement officials, either voluntarily or in response to compulsory process.”) 
Indiana courts have also held that public duty is sufficient to justify disclosure, even in the absence of formal 
process or compulsion by law. Id. 
102 Suburban, 408 A.2d at 764. 
103 Obtaining Records by Search Warrant, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:9 (Supp. 1991); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-
C:4, I (Supp.1981). 
104 State v. Sheedy, 474 A.2d 1042, 1044 (N.H. 1984) (citing Pt. 1, Art. 19 of the New Hampshire state constitution 
along with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). 
105 Id.; State v. Flynn, 464 A.2d 268, 274 (N.H. 1983) (discussed infra note 290). 
106 Comment to Disclosure of customer financial records, Ala. Code § 5-5A-43 (1980). 
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C.  Contractual obligations of Banks 
 
The express statutory sources of federal and state privacy rights discussed above are only 
a recent addition to the unique relationships banks and customers have developed with complex 
allocations of responsibilities and obligations.  In a departure from the simple paradigm of a bare 
debtor-creditor relationship, banks have taken on roles as agents and fiduciaries, hence 
implicating the duties of confidentiality and loyalty.  
1.  Implied duty of confidentiality 
 
a.  The Bank-Customer Relationship  
Under a classic debtor-creditor relationship, there is no expectation of privacy.107  
However, courts have hesitated to classify the bank and customer as merely a debtor and 
creditor.108  Rather, judicial descriptions of the relationship operating within the broadly 
construed confines of the debtor-creditor model have thickened the classic conception by 
inferring a limited duty of privacy:  “The relationship between a general depositor and his bank 
is that of creditor-debtor, not a fiduciary relation, but the relation may give rise to some 
particular obligation, such as an obligation upon the bank not to disclose matters pertaining to the 
customer’s account without his consent.”109  Some courts have harmonized the creditor-debtor 
and privity aspects of the bank-customer relationship by distinguishing between the duty of the 
bank with regard to the customer’s money and to customer’s records:  
It may be that the relation of a bank to its depositors is that of debtor and 
creditor, but I think it is more than that. As far as the actual money 
deposited is concerned, that is true. But as to the records . . . there is an 
                                                 
107 Schoneweis v. Dando, 435 N.W.2d 666 (Neb. 1989).  However, the Schoneweis court distinguishes between the 
bank’s duty to depositors and borrowers, finding no such duty of privacy with regard to the latter.  
108 E.g., Frame v. Boatman’s Bank, 824 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Mo. App. 1992); Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J. 1929). 
109 Frame, 824 S.W.2d at 495. 
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implied obligation . . . on the bank to keep these from scrutiny until 
compelled by a court of competent jurisdiction to do otherwise.110 
 
One reason for this distinction between deposited money and bank records is the high value 
placed on financial privacy.  As courts in several jurisdictions have recognized:  “Of all the 
rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance . . . but exemption of his private affairs, books 
and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others.”111 
 While some courts have imputed an additional layer of confidentiality by supplementing 
the debtor-creditor paradigm, other courts have relied on a principal-agent model to deduce a 
duty of confidentiality.  For example, the Idaho state courts have held that “in discharging its 
obligation to a depositor a bank must do so subject to the rules of agency.”112  In so finding, the 
court cited a variety of cases across jurisdictions holding that banks must comply with their 
depositors’ orders.113  Relying on cases where courts have held banks liable as agents of their 
customers with regard to forged checks, the Peterson court stated that the bank acted as its 
customer’s agent for the purpose of disclosing information.  From this characterization the court 
inferred that the duty of confidentiality which prohibits an agent from disclosing information to 
the principal's detriment applies with regard to banks disclosing customer information.114  An 
                                                 
110 Brex, 146 A. at 36. 
111 In re Pacific RR Commission, 32 F. 241, 250 (C.C.D. Cal. 1887); see also Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. 
Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894) (decrying law enforcement inquiries that resemble “fishing expeditions”).  
112 Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 289 (Id. 1961). 
113 See, e.g., Crawford v. West Side Bank, 2 N.E. 881, 881 (N.Y. 1885) (“[I]n discharging its obligation as a debtor 
the bank must do so subject to the rules obtaining between principal and agent.”); Dalamatinsko v. First Union Trust 
& Sav. Bank, 268 Ill. App. 314 (1932).  Courts have also recognized that agency also entails loyalty in executing the 
principal’s orders. Finding that the relationship of the bank to its customers “was not only that of debtor and creditor 
but also that of agent and principal,” the court concluded that “the bank owed them the duty of loyalty which every 
agent owes its principal.”  Third Nat’l Bank v. Carver, 218 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Tenn. App. 1948) (holding that bank 
breached duty in paying check despite depositor’s stop-order). However, agency may not govern all banking 
transactions. As the Nebraska courts have distinguished:  “A debtor-creditor relationship exists with respect to funds 
on deposit and a principal-agent relationship exists with respect to the payment by the bank of checks drawn by a 
depositor.”  Selig v. Wunderlich Contracting Co., 69 NW2d 861, 864 (Neb. 1955) (citing 9 CJS, Banks & Banking § 
267, p. 546). 
114 Blumstein & Pohly, Confidentiality, Access & Certainty: Disclosure of Customer Bank Records, 1982 ANN. REV. 
BANKING L. 101, 114. 
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agency relationship entails confidentiality:  “An agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to 
use or to communicate information confidentially given to him by the principal or acquired by 
him.”115  Even if a bank cannot be considered a pure agent of its customers, its role and behavior 
may give rise to the expectation that it will accord with the principles of agency in controlling 
the dissemination of customer information. 
Although courts impute notions of confidentiality and agency into the bank-customer 
relationship, they stop short of classifying banks as the fiduciaries of depositors absent special 
circumstances.116  In a fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary “has a duty to act primarily for the 
benefit of another.”117  Banks are not generally considered fiduciaries because “[i]t is typically 
not expected that the bank will exercise its powers primarily for the benefit of the customer.  
Rather, it is more commonly the expectation that the bank will exercise its power over property 
deposited for its own benefit.”118  Although fiduciary relationships are creatures of contract and 
malleably turn on the reasonable expectations of the parties, most courts and scholars agree that 
“[t]he manifestations of the parties in most bank-customer relations do not give rise to reasonable 
expectations of a fiduciary relation.”119  Although banking transactions do not create fiduciary 
duties by default, fiduciary relationships are not foreign to the banking industry and may arise 
under particular circumstances such as “a business or confidential relationship which induces one 
                                                 
115 Peterson, 367 P.2d at 289 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF AGENCY 2d, § 395). 
116 “The relationship of the institution to the depositor is not typically deemed to be fiduciary in nature. Thus . . . 
absent special circumstances taking it out of the general rule, there is no aspect of a trust in the transaction.” 10 AM. 
JR. 2D BANKS & FIN. INST. § 720. In cases where customers allege that they have a fiduciary relationship with the 
bank, they are typically claiming that the bank had a duty of disclosure to the customer regarding another customer’s 
financial condition, as opposed to a duty of confidentiality. See, e.g., Hooper v. Barnett Bank of W. Fla., 474 So. 2d 
1253 (Fla. App. 1985) (“Where a fiduciary duty to disclose may arise under the facts and circumstances, the jury is 
entitled to weigh this duty to disclose against the bank’s duty of confidentiality.”). But see, e.g., United States v. 
First National Bank, 67 F. Supp. 616, 624 (S.D. Ala. 1946) (considering banks to be the fiduciaries of their 
depositors). 
117 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §§ 2, 170, Comment a (1959). 
118 Symons, supra note 70, at 232. 
119 Id. at 231 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 Comment b, § 15 (1958)) (explaining that the bank-
customer relationship cannot be considered truly fiduciary because banks may personally profit from the money 
deposited by customers). 
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party to relax the care and vigilance it would ordinarily have exercised in dealing with a 
stranger.”  Under such circumstances, “a bank may be held liable for breaching its duty of 
confidentiality in disclosing the financial condition of its customers and depositors.”120  A 
fiduciary relationship may also “arise out of a relationship of confidence, trust, or superior 
knowledge or control.”121  For example, a bank may have a fiduciary relationship to its customer 
when acting as a financial advisor rather than merely as a depository institution.122  
 Although customers do not benefit from the full protections of a fiduciary relationship, 
the incorporation of the concept of agency along with the special value placed on financial 
records have imputed some privacy protections into the bank-customer relationship:  “Courts 
have recognized the special considerations inherent in the bank-depositor relationship and have 
not hesitated to find that a bank implicitly warrants to maintain, in strict confidence, information 
regarding its depositor’s affairs.”123  In addition, even when the level of dependence and trust 
placed in the bank by the customer does not emulate a fiduciary model, courts have noted that 
“intimate, private information is not furnished to any bank official lightly, nor, strictly speaking, 
voluntarily. . . . The delicately balanced relationship thus temporarily created is not, strictly 
speaking, one composed of equals because of the inordinate power of the bank.”  Given the 
“precarious position of the borrower and the relatively superior position of the bank,” courts 
have recognized “a counterbalancing special duty imposed on the part of the bank,” namely 
                                                 
120 Edward J. Raymond, Bank’s liability, under state law, for disclosing financial information concerning depositor 
or customer, 81 ALR 4th 377 § 7 (discussing Rubenstein v. South Denver Nat. Bank, 762 P.2d 755 (Colo. App. 
1988)). 
121 Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Barton-Russell Corp., 585 N.Y.S.2d 889, 945 (1992). 
122 See Gaunt v. Peoples Trust Bank, 379 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Klein v. First Edina Nat’l Bank, 196 
N.W.2d 619 (Minn. 1978). 
123 Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 670 (Md. App. 1979) (holding that absent legal compulsion, bank 
could not reveal info to police) (followed by Taylor v. Nationsbank, 776 A.2d 645 (Md. 2001); White v. Regions 
Bank, 729 So.2d 856 (Ala. Civ. 1998).  Although Maryland has a protective statutory scheme governing bank 
records, much of the Suburban court’s reasoning was based on generally applicable historical and contextual 
reasoning.   
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confidentiality.124  Hence, while banks are not the fiduciaries of their depositors, they do not 
enjoy unbridled discretion with regard to customer records.   
b. Implied in contract 
 
Courts have recognized the implied contract as “a form of express contract wherein the 
elements of the contract are found in and determined from the relations of and the 
communications between the parties, rather than from a single clearly expressed written 
document.”125  In contrast to cases in which there is no express contract and the entire agreement 
must be implied, bank-customer arrangements are usually formalized through written contracts.  
However, the “relations of and the communications between the parties” may impute additional 
duties or obligations into the contract.126  As Edward Gramlich testified to Congress:  “In the 
area of financial information, many customers clearly believe that an implicit contract exists 
between the financial institution and the customer requiring the financial institution to keep 
information confidential.”127 
Courts have historically found confidentiality to be an implied term in bank-customer 
agreements.  In 1924, the King’s Bench in England reasoned, in interpreting a contract:  “The 
court will only imply terms which must necessarily have been in the contemplation of the parties 
in making the contract. . . . I have no doubt that it is an implied term of a banker’s contract with 
                                                 
124 Djowharzadeh v. City National Bank, 646 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Okla. 1982). 
125 Marshall Contractors, Inc. v. Brown Univ., 692 A.2d 665, 669 (R.I. 1997); see also Hercules, Inc. v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996) (“[A]greement implied in fact is founded upon a meeting of minds, which, 
although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light 
of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding.”). 
126 U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (“A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which 
they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify 
terms of an agreement.”). 
127 Statement of Edward Gramlich, supra note 85. 
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his customer that the bank shall not disclose the account.”128  This notion was adopted by 
American banking law, which came to recognize “implied in the contract a certain duty of 
confidentiality.”129  As federal courts have recognized: “All agree that a bank should protect its 
business records from the prying eyes of the public, moved by curiosity or malice. No one 
questions its right to protect its fiduciary relationship with its customers, which, in sound 
banking practice, as a matter of common knowledge, is done everywhere.”130 
Courts in the United States have applied this same line of reasoning in determining that 
bank customers maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their dealings.  As the Supreme 
Court of Idaho reasoned:  
It is implicit in the contract of the bank with its customer or depositor that 
no information may be disclosed by the bank or its employees concerning 
the customer's or depositor's account, and that, unless authorized by law or 
by the customer or depositor, the bank must be held liable for breach of 
the implied contract.131 
 
                                                 
128 Tournier v. Nat’l Provincial & Union Bank, 1 K.B. 461, 480 (1924); see also 10 AM.JUR.2D BANKS § 332 (“It is 
an implied term of the contract between a banker and his customer that the banker will not divulge to third persons, 
without the consent of the customer, either express or implied . . . unless the banker is compelled to do so by order 
of a court.”). 
129 ZOLLMANN, BANKS & BANKING (Vol. 5) § 3413, pp. 379-80 (Depositors have a right of secrecy. A bank 
therefore is under an implied obligation to keep secret its records of accounts, deposits, and withdrawals.”); I.F.G. 
BAXTER, THE LAW OF BANKING 21-22 (2d ed. 1968) (discussing four exceptions to the duty of secrecy: “(a) 
disclosure under compulsion of law, (b) where there is a duty to the public to disclose, (c) where the interests of the 
bank require disclosure, (d) where the disclosure is made with the express or implied consent of the customer”). 
However, subsequent courts have recognized only exceptions (a) and (d). E.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 
367 P.2d 284, 289 (Id. 1961); Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J. 1929); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 
764 (Md. App. 1979). 
130 United States v. First National Bank, 67 F. Supp. 616, 624 (S.D. Ala. 1946). See also THE PRIVACY PROTECTION 
STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 346 (1977) (“The balance to be struck is an old 
one; it reflects the tension between individual liberty and social order. The sovereign needs information to maintain 
order; the individual needs to be able to protect his independence and autonomy should the sovereign overreach.”). 
131 Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Id. 1961). 
 33
Giving determinative weight to implied duties of confidentiality, courts have held banks liable 
for breach of contract even when the bank’s behavior did not violate and state or federal privacy 
statutes.132 
Furthermore, the behavior of banks encourages customers to believe that they are 
entering into a confidential relationship.  Noting that the existence of a confidential relationship 
requires both that the customer trusts the bank to hold his information as confidential and that the 
bank invites or accepts this trust, courts have noted that “banks present a constant invitation to 
intending borrowers, and thus subject themselves to whatever implication or obligation is to be 
drawn from fact.”133  For example, as Bryant Bank promises in its Privacy Statement:  “At 
Bryant Bank, it is trust that is the basis for each customer relationship. . . . We believe that your 
privacy should not be compromised.”134  Similarly, First Guaranty Bank states, “A fundamental 
component of any relationship is trust that the bank will respect the privacy and confidentiality 
of that relationship.  First Guaranty Bank understands and realizes that we have a special duty to 
our customers to safeguard and protect your sensitive information.”135  In light of these 
expansive proclamations of financial privacy, “[b]oth Congress and the state legislatures have 
provided a statutory base to clarify some common reasonable expectations of bank 
customers.”136  Hence, most courts agree that at a minimum, “at least, a bank has an obligation to 
its customers not to disclose unnecessarily, promiscuously, or maliciously their financial 
                                                 
132 Garfield v. NationsBank, 776 A.2d 645 (Md. 2001) (holding that the bank which released its customer’s records 
without consent or compulsion liable for breach of contract, privacy, and confidentiality but finding no statutory 
violations). 
133 M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (1924); Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 642 P.2d 21 
(Colo. App. 1981).  
134 Privacy Statement, Bryant Bank (2005), http://www.bryantbank.com/index.asp?page=951. 
135 Privacy Policy, First Guaranty Bank (2006), http://www.fgb.net/PrivacyPolicy.htm. 
136 Symons, supra 70, at 244 (“These expectations or perceived needs have arisen either from implicit or explicit 
assurances through advertising and other inducements toward an attitude of trust, or from a perceived community 
standard of what is right.”). 
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condition.”137  The Supreme Court has looked to the banking tradition of confidentiality in 
holding that the reasonableness of a privacy expectation depends upon current societal norms 
and upon the context in which the expectation arose.138 
Courts are typically sympathetic to customers whose records have been disclosed without 
their consent because they do not consider information revealed to banks by customers as 
“entirely volitional” since “it is impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary 
society without maintaining a bank account.”139  Even the American Banking Association has 
espoused the position that banks “should, as a general policy, consider information concerning 
its customers [as] confidential, which it should not disclose to others without clear 
justification.”140  Financial records are particularly sensitive because “[t]he totality of bank 
records provides a virtual biography.”141  When providing such extensive information to banks, 
customers expect that the information will be only be used internally.142  This view has been 
embraced by many jurisdictions.  For example, the Supreme Court of Utah reasoned:  
[U]nder an expectation of privacy test, it is reasonable for our citizens to 
expect that their bank records will be protected from disclosure because in 
the course of bank dealings, a depositor reveals many aspects of her 
personal affairs, opinion, habit and associations which provide a current 
biography of her activities.  Since it is virtually impossible to participate in 
the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining an account 
with a bank, opening a bank account is not entirely volitional and should 
                                                 
137 Rubenstein v. S. Denver National Bank, 762 P.2d 755 (Colo. App. 1988) (citing State v. McCray, 551 P.2d 1376 
(Wash. App. 1976)). 
138 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715-17 (1987) (discussing whether an employer’s search of employee’s 
workplace is considered a violation of the employee’s Fourth Amendment rights). 
139 Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino Valley, 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974); Schulhofer, supra note 59, 
at 546 (“Indeed, the Court’s approach paradoxically allows self-protection by actual criminals (who of course can 
choose to conduct their illegal transactions in cash) while leaving the law-abiding citizen with no practical way to 
shield the privacy of her daily life.”). 
140 Milohnoch v. First Nat’l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. App. 1969) (finding breach of implied contractual duty 
for disclosure to third parties); compare 12 C.F.R. § 309.1 (1988) (disclosure of information guidelines for the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). 
141 Burrows, 529 P.2d at 596. 
142 See Blumstein & Pohly, supra note 114, at 109-10. 
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not be seen as conduct which constitutes a waiver of an expectation of 
privacy.143 
 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that borrowers and depositors have a “right to 
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures” in “all papers which [they] supplied to the 
bank to facilitate the conduct of [their] financial affairs upon the reasonable assumption that the 
information would remain confidential.”144  
2. Explicit duties created by contractual language 
 
Banks and customers may buttress these background notions of confidentiality by 
contract.  Indeed, some commentators have noted that instead of pigeonholing relationships into 
dichotomous categories such as debtor-creditor or fiduciary, which are “nothing more than 
specialty contract relations—contract relations shaped by recurring special facts and 
circumstance . . . determined by the intentions of the parties’ manifested intent creates a middle-
ground contract relation,” courts would be better off explicitly relying on contractual notions to 
define the relationship between the parties.  Such deference to contracts would not only better 
reflect the parties’ intent but also encourage more precise contracting.145 
Banks currently present customers with privacy agreements, which speak to customer 
confidentiality in sweeping and deferential terms:  
We recognize the customers’ right to privacy and consider the 
confidentiality and safekeeping of customer information to be one of our 
fundamental responsibilities.  And while information is critical to 
providing quality service, we recognize that one of our most important 
                                                 
143 State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Ut. 1991) (“Such a biography should not be subject to an unreasonable 
seizure by the State government.”); People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d at 89 (Ill. 1983). 
144 Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1290 (Pa. 1979).  
145 Edward L. Symons, supra note 70, at 225-26 (arguing that giving greater weight to contractual obligations “may 
encourage banks both to provide customers with a written elaboration of the true agreement and to take the time to 
be reasonably certain that the important aspects of the true agreement are effectively communicated”); see also id. at 
234-35 (“The confidential relation is a prime example of the courts’ failure to utilize contract fundamentals in 
determining the existence and scope of a volitional relation. . . . [T]he confidential relation concept is a creation of a 
felt need for restitution where courts believe they cannot find contract.”). 
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assets is our customers’ trust, therefore, confidentiality and safekeeping of 
customer information is a priority.146 
 
Such customer agreements invoke notions of privacy that closely track the conception of 
confidentiality espoused in Brex, Burrows, Suburban, and Peterson,147 and shape the 
expectations of customers:  “Although historically the adoption of such privacy policies or 
privacy principles may be done on a voluntary basis, it is important to recognize that the 
incorporation of such principles into customer agreements, or even the communication of such 
principles to individual customers, can create enforceable rights for customers.”148  These 
privacy agreements also represent a change in expectations of privacy since Miller was decided 
thirty years ago:  “Commercial enterprises and financial institutions today commonly allow 
customers to state a preference about how their personal information will be used, and they often 
market guarantees of privacy.  From this, a customer now could reasonably conclude that he or 
she retained control over data entrusted to these third parties.”149 
 Customers may place great stock in the sense of security generated by these statements 
because of their particular concern for financial privacy.  A post-9/11 survey by PC World found 
customers to be more resistant to law enforcement access to their financial records (seventy 
percent of respondents) than their internet use (sixty-three percent) or even their medical records 
(sixty-four percent).  A contemporaneous Harris poll also found that more Americans supported 
                                                 
146 First Community Bank, N.A., and People’s Community Bank, A Division of First Community Bank, N.A., 
Privacy Policy (May 24, 2005), https://www.fcbresource.com/privacy_statement.cfm. 
147 Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J. 1929); Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590 
(Cal. 1974); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. App. 1979); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 
367 P.2d 284, 290 (Id. 1961). 
148 L. Richard Fischer, Emerging Issues in the World of Financial Privacy, Consumer Financial Services Litigation, 
PLI Order No. B0-00NC (Apr. 2000). 
149 Woods, supra note 8, 42-43 (however, Woods concludes that “Miller remains the law for now.”). 
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face-recognition technology to scan for suspected terrorists than closer monitoring of financial 
transactions.150 
Privacy agreements between banks and customers currently espouse one of four 
variations in language, ranging from the most seemingly lenient (“as permitted by law”) to the 
extremely narrow (“as compelled by law”).  
 a. Bank-customer agreements using permissive language 
 In its privacy policy, Sovereign Bank articulates: “We may share certain customer 
information with government and consumer-reporting agencies as permitted or required by such 
laws as the Federal Right to Financial Privacy Act.”151  Similarly, Bank of America states:  “We 
also may disclose . . . Customer Information to credit bureaus and similar organizations and 
when required or permitted by law.”152  The phrase “as permitted” has been interpreted narrowly 
by courts.  When a bank contracts that it will disclose customer information only when 
“permitted” by law, it may not infer permission when the law is silent.  Rather, express 
authorization is necessary.  For example, the federal district court for the western district of 
Virginia held that the collection of a service charge by a debt collector, which was not prohibited 
under state law, did not fit within the confines of the “permitted by law” exception since this 
                                                 
150 Frank Thorsberg, PC World Poll Highlights Privacy Concerns, PCWorld.com (Friday, October 5, 2001), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,64824-page,1/article.html. 
151 E.g., Sovereign Bank Privacy Policy and Interactive Reporting & Initiation Services (IRIS) Account Security 
Overview (January 2007), 
http://www.sovereignbank.com/corporate/downloads/cashmanagement/inforeporting/irisprivacyandsecurity.pdf; 
Privacy Statement, Bryant Bank, http://www.bryantbank.com/index.asp?page=951 (“Bryant Bank will safeguard 
your nonpublic personal information and will not sell or share any of your nonpublic personal information, except as 
provided in this Privacy Policy and Notice or as otherwise required by law.”). 
152 Bank of America Privacy Policy for Consumers 2007, 
http://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/index.cfm?template=privacysecur_cnsmr; Chevy Chase  Bank Privacy 
Pledge, http://www.chevychasebank.com/htm/privacy.html (“We do not disclose any non-public personal 
information about our customers to any other third parties, except as permitted or required by law.”); Notice of 
Citizens Privacy Pledge: Our Pledge to You Regarding the Responsible Use and Protection of Customer Information 
(Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.citizensbank.com/security/privacy.aspx (“You do not have to respond to this notice in 
any way because we share your information only as required or permitted by law.”). 
 38
conduct was not explicitly sanctioned by Virginia law.153  This language has been interpreted in 
other contexts as “intended to limit the creditor’s discretion in disposing of the collateral and to 
apply the same law that governed the security agreements.”154  Analogously, when an agreement 
allows one of the parties to “disclose confidential information . . . to a court . . . in furtherance of 
U.S. legal proceedings,” this language is construed narrowly.  For example, courts have held that 
“[t]he Agreement may be interpreted strictly to require that the confidential information be used 
only in a court, not in settlement talks.”155 
Other banks claim that they will not disclose customer information except “when 
authorized by law.”  For example, Jackson State Bank notes in its privacy statement, “We do not 
disclose any non-public personal information about you to any non-affiliated third party unless 
authorized by you or we are authorized to do so by law.”156  This language is adopted by the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act, which provides that a subpoena may be issued when it “is 
authorized by law and there is reason to believe that the records sought are relevant to a 
legitimate law enforcement inquiry.”157  This language has generally been interpreted in favor of 
disclosure, giving considerable deference to law enforcement authorities.158  Under the GLBA, 
banks are authorized to disclose customer information: 
[T]o comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules, and other applicable 
legal requirements; to comply with a properly authorized . . . investigation 
or subpoena or summons . . . or to respond to judicial process or 
                                                 
153 West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Va. 1983). 
154 United States v. Terrey, 554 F.2d 685, 692 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that United States Small Business 
Administration had a duty to dispose of property in commercially reasonable manner and that “as permitted” clause 
was intended as to limit discretion); Peoples Bank of the Virgin Islands v. Figueroa, 559 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(holding that banks could not volunteer information or respond to unauthorized requests “without breaching duties 
of confidentiality and privacy in its dealings with its customers). 
155 Interclaim Holdings, Ltd. v. Ness, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17945, *25 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2001). 
156 The Jackson State Bank & Trust Policy on Customer Confidentiality and Privacy of Information, 
http://www.jacksonstatebank.com/custserv/privacy.cfm.  
157 12 U.S.C. § 3407(1).  
158 Irani v. United States, 448 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The statute creates entitlements of ‘narrow scope’ and ‘is 
drafted in a fashion that minimizes the risk that customers’ objections to subpoenas will delay or frustrate agency 
investigations.’”) (quoting SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1984)).  
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government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial 
institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized 
by law.159 
 
When the bank has received a subpoena or summons, courts generally find the bank to be 
“authorized” to comply even if the customer objects.  Banks have been allowed to simply ignore 
customer opposition in complying with subpoenas:  “When faced with a petition to quash an IRS 
third-party summons, the government need not move to enforce the summons.  Instead the 
government can rely on the voluntary compliance of third parties to effectuate the summons.”160  
Courts have allowed banks to disclose such information despite acknowledging the duty of 
confidentiality.161  In doing so, courts have ranked the duty of confidentiality as subordinate to 
the duty to comply with subpoenas and summons.162  However, IRS subpoenas differ from FISA 
requests and NSLs because the statutory provisions authorizing IRS subpoenas do not permit the 
bank to challenge the request for records.163  
                                                 
159 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8).  
160 Chapman v. Solar, 2006 U.S. Dist Lexis 68805, *8 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2006) (“A summons issued to a third-
party recordkeeper does not generally implicate a taxpayer’s privacy rights.”) (quoting Cosme v. IRS, 708 F. Supp 
45 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).  Courts have typically found that banks “cannot be held liable for breach of a fiduciary duty or 
for violation of a customer’s right of privacy because of complying with a valid IRS subpoena.”  Schaut v. First 
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 560 F. Supp. 245, 247 (N.D. Ill. 1983).   
161 Banks may also comply with subpoenas even when they have agreed, under seemingly restrictive language, to 
disclose customer information only when “required by law.”  Jacobsen v. Citizens State Bank, 587 S.W. 2d 480 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding no breach of confidentiality by bank in complying with IRS summons despite 
customer’s oral and written instructions to keep information confidential on the ground that federal law preempts the 
imposition of liability); Rush v. Maine Savings Bank, 387 A.2d 1127 (Me. 1978); Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 P.2d 1263 (Kan. 1975) (upholding disclosure of credit information pursuant to 
administrative subpoena); Rycroft v. Gaddy, 314 S.E.2d 39 (S.C. App. 1984). 
162 Dan L. Nicewander, Financial Record Privacy – What Are & What Should Be the Rights of the Customer of a 
Depository Institution?, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 601, 630 (1985). 
163 “The validity of an IRS summons may come before a district court in one of two ways. . . . Under no 
circumstance, however, is a summoned party entitled to bring a proceeding to quash the summons.”  Judicial 
Review of a Summons, United States Attorneys’ Tax Resource Manual 55B (Feb. 2007), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title6/tax0055b.htm. Contra 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) (2006) 
(allowing banks to challenge FISA requests for customer records); 18 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006) (allowing banks to 
analogously challenge NSLs in court). 
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b. Bank-customer agreements using restrictive language 
 Many courts have held that banks may not make any disclosures concerning a depositor’s 
account without the express or implied consent of the customer absent compulsion by law.164  
For example, the Alabama state courts have noted:  “It is now well settled that absent 
compulsion by law, a bank may not make any disclosures concerning a depositor’s account 
without the express or implied consent of the depositor.”165  Some banks have also contracted to 
abide to this narrow standard of disclosure.166  Notably, a subpoena is generally considered 
compulsion.167  When served with a subpoena, the recipient may respond with a written 
objection or move to quash or modify the subpoena if it requires the disclosure of protected 
information.168   
If the recipient objects, the serving party may not inspect or copy any of the requested 
records unless the court which issued the subpoena issues an order to compel the production.  
For example, in the case of a subpoena requesting “suspicious activity reports” from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC), the FDIC was required to challenge the subpoena 
                                                 
164 Bond v. Slavin, 157 Md. App. 340, 851 A.2d 598 (2004); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. 
App. 1979); see also Peoples Bank of the Virgin Islands v. Figueroa, 559 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1977) (bank 
volunteering information breaches duty of confidentiality).  
165 White v. Regions Bank, 729 So. 2d 856 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). 
166 E.g., Privacy Policy Disclosure, Iowa State Bank & Trust Company (September 2006), 
http://www.isbt.com/privacy.php. 
167 “In ruling that the borrower could not recover from the bank for disclosures compelled in a trial from its 
employee, who responded to a subpoena duces tecum, the court ruled that when a witness is asked a question, and 
no objection is made thereto, or, if made, is overruled, it is the duty of the witness to answer and the witness is not 
charged with the duty of determining whether the information sought is relevant or material.” Raymond, 81 ALR 4th 
§ 10 (discussing O'Coin v Woonsocket Institution Trust Co., 535 A.2d 1263 (R.I. 1988)).  This is true in other 
relationships meriting privacy as well, such as patient-doctor confidentiality:  “A professional’s duty to maintain his 
client’s confidences is independent of the issue whether he can be legally compelled to reveal some or all of those 
confidences.”  McCormick v. England, 424 S.E.2d 431, 435 (N.C. App. 1997) (discussing patient-doctor duty of 
confidentiality) In addition, in the patient-doctor context, agreements promising that information will not be 
disclosed unless “compelled by law” may be breached when justified by “compelling public interest or other 
justification,” such as the public policy of protecting the welfare of children through disclosure by physicians. Id. at 
438. Hence, courts often interpret the exceptions to these privacy agreements more broadly than the text of the 
provisions would suggest. 
168 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
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because a court could not compel production of these confidential and sensitive data.169  Hence, 
this Paper’s argument that subpoenaed entities may be required to object to a subpoena to 
preserve the confidentiality of a third party’s information is not without legally sanctioned 
precedent.  The main distinction between the case of the FDIC reports discussed above and 
customer financial records is the source of the obligation; the FDIC’s obligations arise under 
statute while banks’ obligations to their customers are creatures of contract.  However, as 
discussed in the following section, banking contracts are contracts of adhesion which should be 
interpreted as privately drafted laws. 
3.  Interpreting bank-customer agreements as contracts of adhesion 
 
In a landmark paper, Todd Rakoff identified seven factors to consider in determining 
whether an agreement is a contract of adhesion:  (1) the contract is printed as a standard form; (2) 
the contract is presented on a take it or leave it basis, implying little bargaining power; (3) there 
is no bargaining in fact; (4) the seller who drafted the contract is a monopoly; (5) the product 
being sold is of necessity to the buyer; (6) the seller is sophisticated while the buyer is 
unsophisticated; and (7) the buyer did not read or understand the terms.170  With the arguable 
exception of (4), agreements signed by bank customers appear to share all of these 
characteristics. Banking agreements are drafted in advance by the financial institution and are 
presented as invariable.  Courts and scholars have spoken to the essential role of banks to 
economic life in society.171  Consolidating the factors into a simple litmus test, Arthur Leff 
defines contracts of adhesion as “that which would be a contract except that no bargaining power 
                                                 
169 Fed. Deposit Insu. Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9468 (N.D. Oh. May 13, 2005) (holding that a court could not 
compel production of “suspicious activity reports”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(2)(B)). 
170 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176-80 (1983). 
171 ,Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernadino Valley, 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974). 
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really shapes it.”172  Historically, contracts of adhesion have generally been upheld, except in 
cases where the terms or circumstances fall within the traditional exceptions to enforceability 
such as fraud, inducement, or unconscionability.173  More recently, courts have expanded upon 
these historic exceptions by also refusing to hold the adhered party to such a contract “[w]here 
the other party has reason to believe that party manifesting the assent would not do so if he knew 
that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”174 
a. A Realistic Approach to Contracts of Adhesion 
Traditional doctrine proposes that parties should be bound to contracts of adhesion: since 
the adherent had an opportunity to read, his agreement signifies assent to the terms.175  However, 
this inference rests on a mistaken assumption about adherents, most of whom do not actually 
read or comprehend the presented terms.  This behavior is not mere laziness on the part of 
customers; rather, it reflects rational behavior since the terms are not negotiable.176  In reality, 
customers “are boundedly rational decisionmakers who will normally price only a limited 
number of product attributes as part of their purchase decision.”  Drafters capitalize on this 
inherent limitation by supplementing the salient attributes of the contract with self-favoring 
                                                 
172 Arthur Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970); see also Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34 (1929); 
Burrows, 529 P.2d at 595. 
173 Id.; see also Thomas H. Oehmke, Adhesion Contracts, 1 Commercial Abirtration § 9:1 (2006) (“An agreement 
may be voided as a contract of adhesion where there are multiple offending procedural and substantive badges of 
unconscionability. . . . A contract of adhesion is not automatically voidable . . . unless the agreement is unreasonable 
and never meets the parties’ expectations.”). 
174 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211. See, e..g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that a contract in which the customer was assumed not to have paid off any of the 
items on her credit account until she had paid off all of the items “shocked the conscience”). 
175 Lewis v. Great Western Railway, 5 H. & N. 867, 157 Eng. Rep. 1427 (Ex. 1860); Rakoff, supra note 170, at 
1185-87 (discussing and critiquing the historic approach); see also KARL LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION 370 (1962) (arguing that blanket assent can be inferred from agreement because of the signor’s 
opportunity to read). 
176 Rakoff, supra note 170, at 1128. 
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terms.177  Accounting for the predictably self-dealing behavior of the drafting party, Leff posits 
that the traditional equitable gloss on contracts – fraud, duress, and unconscionability – are 
inadequate to regulate contracts of adhesion, analogizing:  “[I]t’s like bandaging a cut on a 
broken leg.”178  Given the utter lack of choice or ability to dicker the terms, contracts of adhesion 
should not be taken at face value to be enforceable. 
b.  Contracts of Adhesion as Private Lawmaking Meriting 
Judicial Scrutiny 
Standard form contracts can be likened to privately made law because they “impos[e] 
officially enforceable duties or creat[e] or restrict[] officially enforceable rights.”179  Law-
making by private entities like financial institutions is non-majoritarian and clearly non-
democratic.  Regulations promulgated by such a process are legitimate only if they conform to 
standards that are arrived at democratically and reflect the public interest.  This principle is 
prevalent with regard to administrative agency decisions, which are upheld only when they 
conform to intelligible principles set forth by the democratically elected Congress.180  Whether 
contracts of adhesion conform to publicly determined standards is a helpful heuristic to figure 
out whether they should be enforced.  As David Slawson has argued:  “Conformity to standards 
also facilitates control because the standards to which we require conformity are those which 
                                                 
177 Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1203, 1203 (2003). 
178 Leff, supra note 172. 
179 W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts & Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
529, 530 (1971). 
180 See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 
(D. D.C. 1971) (holding that the statute did not breach the non-delegation doctrine NDD because the delegation of 
legislative authority was not absolute as it was limited by time, required subsidiary administrative policy allowing 
for assessment by public and courts of adherence to legislative intentions, enabled meaningful judicial review, and 
was required to be fair, generally applicable, and equitable); but see Schecter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935) (invalidating a statute for violating the non-delegation doctrine for delegation of authority to private 
individuals coupled with a lack of procedural safeguards or substantive standards of judicial review). 
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bear on the factors we consider relevant.”181  For contracts of adhesion to be enforceable under a 
public law framework, it is necessary to establish the legitimacy of delegating some lawmaking 
to private parties. 
In the case of bank-customer relations, “Rather than holding the bank only to those 
obligations that it has freely assumed, as a matter of fixed public policy, Congress has imposed 
upon banks other obligations of confidentiality.  These obligations have been imposed based on a 
legislatively determined sense of fairness and reasonableness established to protect expectations 
or perceived needs.”182  Judicial review is essential to determining whether individual 
contracting systems conform to such legislative standards.  Although courts typically uphold 
contracts unless their provisions were egregious enough to be considered fraudulent, induced, or 
unconscionable,183 courts should apply a more scrutinizing standard of review to contracts 
likened to private lawmaking. Slawson makes the case for a more critical approach to contracts 
of adhesion by noting that in striking down contracts of adhesion, courts would not be striking a 
blow to freedom of contract generally because of the peculiar and coercive means by which these 
agreements were entered into.  
Contracts are based on a meeting of the minds and embody the intentions of the 
contracting parties.184  Hence, Slawson encourages courts to parse contractual provisions closely 
to discern which ones reflect shared intent:  “[O]nly the expressions, or manifestations, of 
consent of the contracting parties should be called the contract and should be enforced, generally, 
                                                 
181 Slawson, supra note 179, at 536. 
182 Symons, supra note 70, at 244 (1983).  
183 U.C.C. § 1-304 (“Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good 
faith in its performance or enforcement.”); U.C.C. § 2-302 (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
term of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract . . . .”). 
184 “Because parties incur contractual liability only if they make a voluntary, informed promise, contractual 
obligations can be said to arise out of the parties’ consent. . . . [T]he autonomy and economic justifications of 
contract law presuppose a vital connection between the parties’ intent and the obligations contract law enforces.”  
ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW & THEORY 676-77 (3d ed. 2002). 
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without question.”185  In enforcing contracts, courts generally honor the reasonable expectations 
of the parties.186  Courts should be particularly cognizant of what those expectations were at the 
time of contracting in cases of contracts of adhesion, where the written contracts with their 
lengthy standard-form language and non-dickered terms are uniquely unlikely to reflect what the 
adherent expected from the relationship.  As Slawson recognizes:  “Reasonable expectations are 
determined not by what the form recites but by the actual context in which the transaction is 
conducted.”187 
c. Particular Vulnerabilities of Contracts of Adhesion 
The greatest discord between contractual provisions and customer expectations may be 
reflected in clauses expressing how the institution would behave in case of a particular 
contingency.  Courts should exercise heightened vigilance in enforcing such contingent clauses 
because they are the least likely to be read or understood by customers, since it is “notoriously 
difficult for most people, who lack legal advice and broad experience concerning the particular 
transaction type, to appraise these sorts of contingencies.”188  Of particular concern with regard 
to disclosure provisions is that “individuals might treat certain low-probability risks as if they 
were virtually non-existent” because “they are excessively confident in their likelihood of 
avoiding harm.”  Furthermore, “people often assess risk via the ‘availability heuristic,’ judging 
risk to be high when the type of harm is familiar or easily imagined and low when it is not.”189  
                                                 
185 Slawson, supra note 179, at 541 (concluding that “[t]he standard form is not a contract”). 
186 E.g., Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 801 (Ut. 1992) (“In general, the reasonable 
expectations doctrine authorizes a court confronted with an adhesion contract to enforce the reasonable expectations 
of the parties under certain circumstances.”); see generally, Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST.L.J. 823 (1990).  
187 Slawson, supra note 179, at 544. 
188 Rakoff, supra note 170, at 1255. 
189 Korobkin, supra note 177, at 1233. Contra Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration & the Windfall Principle of 
Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1991) (courts may not be any more well-positioned to allocate risks of 
unexpected contingencies than the parties drafting the contracts). 
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The risk of being suspected or targeted in a counterterrorism investigation is perhaps as 
unfamiliar or unimaginable to most people as it comes.  Hence, customers will systematically 
undervalue any protections proffered by banks ex ante and are unlikely to notice when banks 
grant themselves considerable leeway to disclose customer information to law enforcement 
authorities.190  
Knowing that customers lack the willingness and ability to evaluate contingent terms 
such as disclosure procedures, banks realize only a few terms will engage customer attention and 
need to be drafted in a favorable manner.191  As a result, the adhering party is “frequently not in a 
position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a 
monopoly or because all competitors use the same clauses.”192  To the extent that courts uphold 
such terms, they are merely sanctioning the “[u]se of form contracts [which] enables firms to 
legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner” without any political accountability.193  Instead 
of espousing a uniform presumption of enforceability or unenforceability of form contracts, 
some commentators favor a more nuanced approach under which the legal response would 
depend on the “social importance of the contract” and the “degree of monopoly enjoyed by the 
author.”194 
 A more draconian approach to contracts of adhesion than conditioning enforceability 
upon conformance to societal, democratically-developed standards is considering adhesive terms 
to be presumptively unenforceable.  The two approaches are may often lead to a shared outcome 
                                                 
190 Compare What Price Privacy?, 56 CONSUMER REPORTS 356 (May 19991, Issue 5) (“There's no conspiracy afoot 
to deny Americans their rights or start Big Brotherish monitoring of our activities. Instead, privacy is being slowly 
eroded. ‘The potential threat is large. . . . But it's hard for people to get worked up about it because the erosion is 
usually quite subtle.”). 
191  Korobkin, supra note 177. 
192  Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 
629, 640 (1943). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 642. 
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since “[m]any of the terms in typical form documents are specifically designed to displace clear 
rules of law that would otherwise govern the transaction”195 and such terms would not be upheld 
under a litmus test of conformance.  This approach has been proposed by Rakoff, who questions 
judicial deference to adhesive contracts in light who their drafters are, noting that “business firms 
do not resemble the types of voluntary organizations to which the law gives great deference.”196  
Along with fears of self-dealing and one-sided terms, comparative institutional competence may 
also favor delegating the allocation of risks to popularly elected bodies:  “Legislatures are likely 
to be more institutionally competent to consider the preferences of the entire range of contracting 
parties than judges who . . . consider[] individual disputes.”197  This suggests that judicial review, 
either under the historic deference to contracts of adhesion or even under the heightened scrutiny 
proposed by Slawson may be insufficient to efficiently protect customer expectations.  One 
possible middle ground may be to treat contracts of adhesion as informative in determining 
parties’ rights rather than directly enforceable on their terms: standard forms, and the expert 
judgments they reflect, could be treated as “possible evidence of what the legally implied terms 
should be, rather than as an independent basis for enforcement.”198 
 Critics of adhesive contracts acknowledge that forcing institutions to abide by socially 
sanctioned terms which they may gloss over by drafting contracts in a vague or complex manner 
in a more permissive regime may result in higher prices.  However, many see higher prices as 
preferable to misleading customers by enforcing contracts that do not conform to their 
expectations.  As Rakoff infers, “If the point is that onerous terms are justified by an apparent 
consumer preference for low prices, it rests on a failure to perceive the institutional dynamic that 
                                                 
195 Rakoff, supra note 170, 1183. 
196 Id. at 1241 (arguing that considering standard-form contracts to be presumptively enforceable would not 
endanger freedom of contract among individuals). 
197 Korobkin, supra note 177, at 1249. 
198 Rakoff, supra note 170, at 1265.  
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leads adherents to focus exclusively on visible terms.”199  This Paper will address customer 
willingness to pay a premium for greater protection of financial information in the Appendix. 
4. Banks as private enterprise drafted into law enforcement by the 
state 
 
As discussed in the section above, courts should approach terms in bank agreements 
allowing banks to disclose customer information to law enforcement authorities with greater 
scrutiny because customers may not have willingly and knowingly agreed to these terms.  Even 
when these terms comply with the relevant federal laws requiring the collection and disclosure of 
customer information, question remain as to why the government is covertly soliciting this 
information from banks rather than acting publicity as its own agent subject to the controls of the 
electorate. 
On one hand, the government may not prefer to privatize its information collection 
schemes because society is often more skeptical of the motives of profit-maximizing private 
entities.200  However, since the collection and dissemination of information does not appear to be 
closely linked to any profit-making end, it seems unlikely that there would be any greater 
skepticism toward the motives of a private rather than public entity.  Furthermore, since 
customers are not notified when their records are solicited, the private institutions remain largely 
immune from public criticism.201  Allowing the government to draft private enterprise into its 
national security operations without publicly acknowledging this partnership is particularly 
dangerous because unlike market-regulated private entities, the government may be particularly 
                                                 
199 Id. 
200 Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices & Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1441, 1459 (“A different quality or depth of indignation might be aroused by the company that hazards 
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201 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d). 
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cavalier about the risks involved in its behavior, having the unique capability to justify its actions 
as “in the public interest” despite the potentially adverse effects.202  
Privatization can be a strategic move to avoid the high visibility that accompanies overt 
state action.  After all, public awareness may well be followed by an unfavorable response by the 
electorate.203  The government is considered an agent subject to control by the public, unlike 
private organizations like financial institutions.  For example, a program that explicitly required 
individuals to report all of their financial transactions to a central data-gathering government 
agency would create much greater public outcry than a government policy of secretly requesting 
the same information from banks rather than their customers.204  By implementing an indirect 
program, the government is capitalizing on the difficulties any principal (in this case the public) 
faces in monitoring its agent (in this case the government), particularly when the agent’s actions 
are shrouded in confidentiality and farmed out to complicit private entities.205 
Furthermore, non-compulsory NSLs are being issued by agencies which could not get 
access to these records through the usual avenues of inter-agency cooperation or congressional 
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mandate.206  This may reflect the reality that it is often easier for a public agency to change the 
behavior of a private organization than of another public agency.207  However, the fact that the 
CIA and DoD could not get Congressional backing for their national security letters implies 
something about the political unwillingness of elected parties to support this scheme.208  
By masking the gathering of information through nondisclosure requirements that prevent 
banks from notifying customers that their records have been requested, the government has 
largely evaded the heightened scrutiny courts apply to state action.209  It is possible that a 
strategic move to privatize information collection in order to avoid judicial inference of 
constitutional obligations would be ineffectual since the courts could easily look beyond the 
nominally private actor to discern the underlying state actor.210  However, this veneer of private 
action can be quite effective since courts are, in practice, often reluctant to reclassify private 
actors as essentially public.211 
However, judicial control is particularly essential in the financial privacy context because 
the public is ill-equipped to effectively monitor government activity.212  Courts are the only 
                                                 
206 See infra Sec. II.C. 
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entities informed of FISA requests and NSLs, and even then only in the minority of cases where 
banks bring challenges.  Hence, judicial remedies must supplement the political processes that 
generally serve as a check on state actors.  The Supreme Court considered previously considered 
the claim that “when a bank makes and keeps records under compulsion of the Secretary’s 
regulations it acts as a Government agent and thereby engages in a ‘seizure’ of its customer’s 
records.”213  However, in that case regarding the constitutionality of the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act, 
the Court held that since the banks were merely maintaining records and only disclosing 
transactions to the government when faced with a subpoena, there was no illegal search or 
seizure.214  
 
IV. Opportunities & obligations to challenge law enforcement inquiries 
 
The obligations of banks to their customers – whether mandated by statute or invited by 
contract – prevent banks from exercising full discretion in actions implicating customer privacy.  
Although banks must respect the authority of law enforcement agencies, they should also act in 
accordance with the reasonable expectations of their customers rather than merely abiding by the 
most lenient reading of the contracts of adhesion they draft.  While notions of confidentiality 
generally inform the bank-customer relationship, how a bank should act when called on to 
divulge customer information in a particular instance depends on the type of request, the type of 
relationship, and the jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Bank Secrecy Act and declined to find violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments.  E.g., 
California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
213 Id. at 22. 
214 Id. at 54 (“That the bank in making the records required by the Secretary acts under the compulsion of the 
regulation is clear, but it is equally clear that in doing so it neither searches nor seizes records in which the depositor 
has a Fourth Amendment right.”). 
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As discussed above, neither the FISA nor the NSL statute, in giving banks the power to 
object to law enforcement inquiries, requires the exercise of this newly granted authority.215  
However, customers expect that banks will guard their information and protect their privacy.216  
This expectation is an essential part of the bank-customer relationship as encouraged by bank 
statements, understood by both customers and courts, and embodied in the privacy agreements 
banks draft for their customers to sign.217  While providing a general guarantee of privacy, these 
agreements contain exceptions allowing the bank to disclose customer records in response to law 
enforcement inquiries.  Courts have typically construed these exceptions narrowly but granted 
great deference to law enforcement in allowing banks to release customer information.218  
However, allowing banks to disclose customer information whenever permitted by the 
plain language of the bank-customer agreements does not account for the fact that these 
agreements are contracts of adhesion.  Because these agreements were drafted en masse by the 
financial institution and presented to the adherent on non-negotiable terms, they do not 
necessarily reflect the intent or even the assent of the customer.219  Given the circumstances 
surrounding their origin, the precise language of bank-customer agreements should not be 
entitled to deference unless they conform to democratically-determined standards,220 namely the 
respect for financial privacy reflected by Congressional enactments such as the RFPA, GLBA 
                                                 
215 However, the FISA and NSL contexts are unique from other forms of government requests for records, such as 
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and, more recently, the Reauthorized Patriot Act with its new focus on the importance of pre-
enforcement. 
A. Type of Law Enforcement Inquiry 
 
Bank-customer agreements uniformly permit banks to disclose customer information in 
under compulsion by law.221  Courts have generally considered subpoenas to be compulsion, 
valuing bank compliance with law enforcement over customer confidentiality.222  In other 
contexts, courts tend to be deferential to subpoenas when ruling on a motion to quash.223  
However, I will argue in this section that the unique circumstances surrounding FISA requests 
for records and NSLs warrant greater judicial scrutiny. 
1. FISA Section 215 Requests 
a. FISA Section 215 requests lack the ex ante procedural 
safeguard of warrants 
At first brush, effectuating a request for documents under Section 215 looks similar to 
obtaining a search warrant because both require judicial approval.224  However, a closer look at 
the FISA request process reveals that the judicial role should be regarded as more of a ministerial 
nod of approval than a critical eye.  Although applications for FISA “warrants” are reviewed by 
specially selected federal judges, these judges are given only minimal criteria on which to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the applications.225  Rather than the showing of probable cause 
required to typically obtain a search warrant, the applicant need only show that the records are 
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sought for a foreign intelligence, clandestine, or international terrorism investigation.226   The 
ACLU has argued that “[a]s a result of the changes effected by the Patriot Act, the FBI is now 
authorized to use Section 215 even against people who are known to be altogether unconnected 
to criminal activity or espionage.”227 
Furthermore, the agency is not required to show any special need for secrecy which 
requesting a clandestine search.228  “Thus, although FISA requires a court order, the judge’s role 
is far more limited than in domestic law enforcement situations.”229  These emaciated judicial 
protections are coupled with greater flexibility in investigative procedures than is typically 
permitted in conventional criminal investigations.  Perhaps most notably, FISA authorizes 
clandestine search tactics which prevent the suspect from being notified.  Even if the suspect is 
eventually prosecuted, the defense attorney is not usually permitted to review the associated 
surveillance documents.  In addition, FISA searches may be authorized for broader timelines 
with less judicial supervision than in conventional investigations.230   
There are also fewer ex post safeguards following the search or surveillance than in a 
conventional investigation.  Judicial review at the completion of the surveillance action is merely 
optional.  Those subjected to clandestine searches may never be notified unless they are 
eventually prosecuted, making it effectively impossible to obtain remedies for unwarranted 
intrusions into privacy even though the Patriot Act provides for a civil damages scheme.231  As 
                                                 
226 Former Attorney General John Ashcroft has testified that the “reason to believe that the target is an agent of a 
foreign power” standard “may be said to be lower than probable cause.” Testimony to the House Judiciary 
Committee (June 5, 2003).  
227 Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, Complaint at 6, 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/mcaa2ash73003cmp.pdf. 
228 Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 544. 
229 Id. at 533. 
230 Id. at 534. 
231 18 U.S.C. 2520(g), 2707(g) (imposing civil liability for any willful use or unauthorized disclosure of 
information); 18 U.S.C. 2712 (creating a cause of action against the United States for victims of 
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commentators have concluded: “In all of these respects, the FISA regime offers far less 
accountability and a greatly enhanced risk of abuse.”232 
Since the specific reports of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC” or 
“FISA Court”) regarding individual applications are not publicly released, it is difficult to assess 
how closely the applications are reviewed.  While the aggregate numbers indicate that the court 
has been playing a more active role since the passage of the 2001 Patriot Act, over ninety-nine 
percent of applications are approved.  Before 2001, the FISA Court received about 750 
applications per year and had never rejected a single one.233  In 2003, the FISC reviewed 1724 
applications and denied only four.  These numbers have led notable civil liberties groups to refer 
to the FISC as a rubber stamp.234  Before 9/11, the FBI was required to certify that the records 
were sought for a foreign intelligence purpose and that “specific facts” confirmed that the 
records pertained to the agent of a foreign power.  In the 2001 Patriot Act, both of these 
requirements were dropped and replaced only by a good-faith standard.235  Furthermore, the 
FISA Court has a very limited and deferential standard of review, and lacks statutory authority to 
examine or reject the FBI’s certification that the records are sought for an investigation related to 
foreign intelligence or terrorism.236 
                                                                                                                                                             
willful violations of the FISA requirements relating to surveillance or physical searches). But see Schulhofer, supra 
note 59, at 542-43 (“But the civil remedy is virtually meaningless because those individuals, unless subsequently 
prosecuted, can virtually never learn that they had been under surveillance.”). 
232 Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 538; see also Patrick Leahy, Charles Grassey & Arlen Specter, FBI Oversight in the 
107th Congress by the Senate Judiciary Committee: FISA Implementation Failures, An Interim Report (Feb. 2003), 
available at (Grassley.senate.gov/releases/2003/p03r02-25c.pdf). 
233 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders 1979-2005, Electronic Privacy Information Center (May 2, 2006), 
www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html. 
234 Timothy Edgar & Witold Walczak, We Can Be Both Safe & Free: How the PATRIOT Act Threatens Civil 
Liberties, 76 PA. BAR. ASSOC. Q. 21, 22 (2005) (“[T]he PATRIOT Act in some cases eliminates judicial review 
entirely, through national security letters for instance, and in many instances changes the review standard to make 
judges little more than rubber stamps.”). 
235 Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 548-49 (“It is no longer necessary for the FBI to have factual support for its 
decision to investigate, and it is not even necessary for agents to believe that the targeted person is a suspected 
offender or a foreign agent.”) 
236 § 1861(b)(2) & (c)(1). 
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b. FISA Section 215 requests lack the ex post procedural 
safeguards of subpoenas 
During the discovery phase of conventional civil litigation, private litigants may issue 
subpoenas without prior judicial approval.  However, unlike bank customers whose records are 
subpoenaed by FISA requests, recipients of conventional civil subpoenas in private litigation are 
notified of the document production request and have an opportunity to challenge it in court by 
filing a motion to quash the subpoena.237  Hence, “the recipient of a subpoena gets a procedural 
option not available to the target of a search: she can challenge the subpoena prior to releasing 
the information.”238  The recipient may file a motion to quash and receive a hearing in front of a 
judge. Although the requirements which must be met for a subpoena to be upheld as valid are 
minimal, “judicial oversight, even in this highly diluted form, does act as a check on unrestricted 
official snooping, and it provides the subpoena recipient an important guarantee of 
accountability.”239  Furthermore, judicial oversight may be particularly influential in the arena of 
financial privacy, since courts are reluctant to compel the discovery of personal financial records. 
Courts typically decline to uphold subpoenas for financial information in civil suits, failing to 
find such inquiries relevant under normal circumstances.240  
By contrast, in the case of a FISA request, the customer is never notified of the subpoena 
and hence has no ability to contest it.  Unless banks challenge these subpoenas, “they eliminate 
any opportunity to seek a judicial inquiry into the reason for an investigative demand and the 
significance of the information sought” along with “virtually any possibility of public 
                                                 
237 FED. R. CIV. P.  45(c)(3)(A). 
238 Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 545. 
239 Id.  
240 Jack W. Campbell, Revoking the “Fishing License”: Recent Decisions Place Unwarranted Restrictions on 
Administrative Agencies; Power to Subpoena Personal Financial Records, 49 VAND. L. REV. 395, 432 (1996). E.g., 
Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 69 (allowing compulsion of financial 
records to enforce a judgment). 
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criticism.”241  This is particularly disturbing since judicial review has been called “the most 
common and important civil liberties protection.”242 
2.  National Security Letters lack even the procedural protections of 
FISA requests 
The NSL process lacks the even the minimal judicial safeguards mandated by the 
formalistic FISA request procedure.  To issue an NSL, the agency need not seek judicial 
approval prior to enforcement.243  Courts only enter the process if the recipient of the letter 
petitions to have the letter modified or set aside.244  Since customers are not the recipients of the 
letters and do not receive notice, they rely on banks to involve courts when necessary.  Indeed, 
banks serve as the gatekeepers to judicial review of national security letters. 
Banks should take it upon themselves to challenge national security letters or at least to 
review the letters in order to make a reasoned determination as to whether a challenge may be 
necessary.  While a subpoena may be considered compulsion of law and many bank agreements 
explicitly mention subpoenas as an exception to nondisclosure requirements, this exception 
should not be interpreted to include NSLs.245  Furthermore, most federal cases holding that a 
depositor has no proprietary interest in his bank records and, consequently, no standing to 
challenge the solicitation of his records by law enforcement authorities under the Fourth 
Amendment, involve customers resisting formal subpoenas or summons authorized by 
administrative or judicial bodies, not merely informal requests.246  NSLs are not backed by a 
                                                 
241 Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 554. 
242 Edgar & Walczak, supra note 234, at 22. 
243 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2006); Rosen, supra note 23 (“National-security letters are especially susceptible to 
abuse because they’re not subject to independent review by a judge or magistrate and because the recipients are 
forbidden to discuss them.”). 
244 18 U.S.C. § 3511 (2006). 
245 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8). 
246 E.g., United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1212-1213 (8th Cir. 1969); Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 
317-318 (9th Cir. 1969); Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1968); Interstate Commerce 
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comparable force of law – a judicially decreed order – unless they are challenged and 
subsequently upheld in court.247  Hence, permissive compliance to NSLs does not fall within the 
strict confines of the “as compelled by law” language adopted by many banks in their privacy 
agreements.248  Furthermore, blind acquiescence to the whims of law enforcement does not meld 
with the case law in most states, which has limited the disclosure of customer records to 
authorities to subpoenas, summons, and other formal processes.249  In addition, releasing records 
without a hard look at the nature of the request and the requesting authority conflicts with banks’ 
promises to respect customer privacy and their self-assigned duty of confidentiality.250  This is 
particularly true when banks take on heightened obligations to their customers by serving in 
more intimate roles.251  
Courts should approach bank compliance with non-compulsory NSLs with the same 
skepticism they have toward voluntary disclosure in analogous contexts.  The Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit has held that a bank cannot voluntarily disclose customer information to 
government authorities.  In finding that banks could not grant the Internal Revenue Service 
informal access to bank records, the court determined that voluntary cooperation is not exempt 
from the requirements of the RFPA:  
                                                                                                                                                             
Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894). But see Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal But Is It Mine? Toward 
Property Rights in Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379 (2003). 
247 18 U.S.C. § 3511(c) (2006). 
248 Winer, supra note 40. 
249 See infra Subsec. III.C.2.b. 
250 In analogous contexts, banks have conditioned their deference to law enforcement authorities on the presence of a 
subpoena.  For example, in holding that a bank must comply with a subpoena and its non-disclosure requirement 
despite its promulgated privacy policy, the Kansas state court accorded considerable weight to the fact that the law 
enforcement request was a subpoena.  In that case, the Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
had issued the subpoena, but judicial intervention was required for its enforcement:  “The Commissioner’s subpoena 
power is not self-executing. There is an avenue open to challenge the Commissioner’s alleged abuse of his 
investigative powers.”  Brant v. Bank of America, 31 P.3d 952, 959 (Kan. 2001). 
251 Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App. 1977) (implying a confidential relation where bank employees 
were called upon to give advice to customers); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(f) (“The term ‘mutual savings bank’ means a bank 
without capital stock transacting a savings bank business, the net earnings of which inure wholly to the benefit of its 
depositors after payment of obligations for any advances by its organizers.”). 
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We therefore, hold that a financial institution and a government authority . 
. . otherwise bound by the procedural requirements of the RFPA . . . are 
not exempted . . . from those procedural requirements merely because the 
financial institution voluntarily chooses to allow the IRS . . . to examine 
financial records pertaining to a taxpayer.252 
 
Similarly, the California courts rejected voluntariness of the bank’s disclosure as a defense to 
allegations of Fourth Amendment violations, reasoning that the customer “has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the bank statements, [and] the voluntary relinquishment of such records 
by the bank at the request of the police does not constitute a valid consent.”253 
 Before the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1987, the FBI could only issue such non-
mandatory letters. A substantial number of financial institutions complied voluntarily.  However, 
as FBI officials testified to a House Committee that proposed the 1987 amendment, “in certain 
significant instances, financial institutions have declined to grant the FBI access to financial 
records in response to requests under § 1114(a) . . . particularly in States which have State 
constitutional privacy protection or State banking privacy laws.”254  Financial institutions which 
did not comply with the letters claimed that “State law prohibit[ed] them from granting access 
and the RFPA, since it permits but does not mandate such access, does not override State law” 
and feared that “cooperation might expose them to liability to the customer to whose records the 
FBI sought access.”  255  That Congress felt the need to amend the statute to make compliance 
mandatory in order to ensure that banks would not be liable for disclosing records in response to 
                                                 
252 Neece v. IRS, 922 F.2d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The provisions of the RFPA provide an elaborate mechanism 
to protect a taxpayer’s privacy rights in records kept by third parties. We must protect this mechanism.”). 
253 Burrows at 590. 
254 The House committee did not speak directly to the potential for liability under the original § 1114(a) but noted 
that the addition of section 404 would solve this noncompliance problem: “[B]y providing for mandatory FBI access 
to a customer’s or entity’s records for counterintelligence purposes in certain circumstances, [§ 404] preempts State 
law to the contrary which otherwise would not permit such access.”  H.R. Rep. 99-690(I), supra note 80, at 14-15. 
255 Id.  Note that Congress remained cautious of giving the FBI too much discretion in extending this grant of 
authority to issue NSLs with mandatory compliance. For example, the House Committee “carefully considered 
whether to grant the FBI mandatory access to financial records for foreign counterintelligence purposes upon a 
determination that there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual is or may be a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,” but rejected the “or may be” language as “provid[ing] an 
unwarranted degree of latitude.” H.R. Rep. 99-690(I), supra note 80, at 17. 
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NSLs indicates that noncompulsory letters do not enjoy absolute priority over state privacy 
protections.  
 By passing the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1987, Congress clearly stated that 
mandatory NSLs supersede state privacy protections without addressing whether compulsory 
letters similarly take precedent over contractual obligations.  However, by negative implication 
and from Congress’s felt need to amend the statute to require compliance, it appears that 
Congress was not willing to claim that non-compulsory letters were entitled to the unwavering 
deference of banks.  Given the tenuous authority and minimal procedural safeguards of non-
compulsory NSLs, banks should not prioritize compliance over state constitutional provisions 
and statutory regimes256 or self-generated promises of privacy.  Hence, banks should be required 
to institute a policy of challenging non-mandatory national security letters or at least engaging in 
critical review to determine the whether NSLs should be challenged on a case by case basis. 
 
B.  When do depositors have a right against banks that banks exercise 
their full rights against the government? 
As demonstrated above, the FISA request process appears to involve less judicial 
oversight in practice than the text of section 215 might suggest. The revised FISA statute does 
not indicate upon what grounds a request will be struck down if challenged. Reasoning by 
analogy to the subpoena context, FISA requests will presumably be denied upon review when 
they fail to meet the minimal standard of showing that the records are sought for a foreign 
intelligence investigation.257  Although courts have almost unanimously held that subpoenas are 
                                                 
256 See infra Sec. III.B. 
257 Testimony of former Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 226.  
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considered compulsion by law258 and bank-customer privacy agreements typically allow for 
disclosure under such circumstances,259 the FISA requests are distinct from traditional subpoenas 
because customers are not notified and cannot object.  
Furthermore, banks are bound not merely by the bare text of these privacy agreements, 
but by their construction as contracts of adhesion.260  Since provisions enumerating the 
circumstances under which a bank may disclose customer information are neither negotiable nor 
salient, there is little reason to believe that customers actually understand or accept these 
terms.261  These contracts merit greater deference when they conform to publicly determined 
standards.262  In this case, the Reauthorized Patriot Act evinces that Congress is espousing a 
policy permitting banks to challenge FISA requests.263  Given this development, courts should 
not be strong-armed by banks unilaterally limiting their obligations to customers through 
adhesive contracts.  Rather, courts should make their own determination as to whether the 
contracts are in line with Congressional intent before honoring them.   
In considering the customer expectations of privacy as reflected in the guiding principles 
behind legislative acts like the RFPA, judicial decisions like Brex and Peterson, and the very 
privacy policies distributed by banks themselves, a court may well conclude that banks should 
not yield to a FISA request without due consideration of the nature and basis of the request.  This 
is even truer in the case of an NSL, which is not subjected to pre-enforcement judicial review 
and hence should not be considered compulsion by law.264  Finally, non-mandatory NSLs are by 
                                                 
258 See infra Subsec. III.C.2.b. 
259 See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
260 Rakoff, supra note 170, at 1176-80; see generally infra Subsec. III.C.3. 
261 Korobkin, supra note 177, at 1233. 
262 Slawson, supra note 179, at 536. 
263 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f); 18 U.S.C. § 5311. 
264 See infra Sec. II.B. 
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definition not compulsory in nature.265  When the issuing agency requests records on an 
admittedly optional basis, courts should be reluctant to hold that banks may comply pro forma 
despite the promises their relationships with their customers.266  
 
V. Contracting to require challenges 
 
Since Congress has given banks the statutory authorization to challenge FISA requests, 
customers may contractually obligate banks to take on this role.  The Reauthorized Patriot Act 
has empowered banks, but has only created uncertainty for customers, who have no way to 
predict whether a bank would challenge requests for their records and under what 
circumstances.267  The possibility that one’s financial records may be disclosed in response to a 
government inquiry is more disconcerting to some customers than others.  As one commentator 
has noted in considering personal valuations of financial privacy, the “golden mean” is “a 
solution tailored to individual preferences and values.”268 
Perhaps the least controversial version of such a contract would be a promise on the part 
of the bank to engage in some internal review or consultation to determine whether the request is 
lawfully authorized.  If the bank determines that the FISA request is not lawful because it fails to 
meet the requirements of section 215, the bank would then be required to challenge it: a bank 
                                                 
265 See infra Sec. II.C.  
266 E.g., Neece v. IRS, 922 F.2d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1990). 
267 Steven A. Bibas, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUBLIC POL’Y 591, 609 (1994) 
(“[F]lexibility produces uncertainty for private parties.  In the hands of the contracting parties, however, flexibility 
allows people to control their lives efficiently and tailor the law to meet their needs.”). 
268 Id. at 593 (“Many people fear the loss of their privacy in a computerized “Naked Society.”  Others, however, are 
less concerned about the need for privacy and may be unwilling to sacrifice the benefits generated by the 
information economy.”); see also Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers & the Commercial Dissemination 
of Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395 1424 (1987) (“[T]he inflexible nature of an across-the-board 
statutory remedy might render the remedy inadequate to deal with the fluid nature of the information economy.”). 
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cannot be “compelled” to disclose information by an unlawful request. 269  While banks cannot 
be held liable by statute for disclosing records in response to a subpoena, they may be held liable 
on contractual grounds for failing to take the appropriate procedural precautions permitted by the 
statute and expected by customers.270 
A. Terms? 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, privacy agreements as currently drafted may 
obligate banks to challenge some law enforcement inquiries in light duties accrued from 
statutory protections and or the banking tradition of confidentiality.  However, the tenuous nature 
of these financial privacy protections provides questionable assurance of privacy for customers at 
best.271  In light of the recent procedural nod to financial privacy embedded in the Reauthorized 
Patriot Act, banks and their customers should be permitted to contract for more meaningful 
assurance that requests for financial records by law enforcement authorities will be challenged.  
This could be structured as an absolute promise to challenge all requests, to challenge a 
particular kind of request (e.g., NSLs but not FISA requests), or, more flexibly, a pledge to create 
a policy of internal review that would examine each request to determine whether a challenge 
would be appropriate.  For example, in deciding whether to object to an administrative subpoena, 
institutions should consider the overarching legitimacy of the request, particularly whether the 
issuing agency was authorized to issue the subpoena and whether the subpoena seeks 
information protected by federal or state constitutional or statutory rights. In addition, institutions 
can analyze the specifics of the request, such as whether the subpoena was timely and properly 
                                                 
269 E.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Ut. 1991). 
270 50 U.S.C. § 1861(e) (2006) (“A person who, in good faith, produces tangible things under an order pursuant to 
this section shall not be liable to any other person for such production.”). 
271 Edgar & Walczak, supra note 262, at 22 (providing statistics which imply that ex ante judicial review is merely a 
rubber stamp). 
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served, whether it describes the solicited documents with enough particularity, and whether the 
requested production would be unduly burdensome.272  Since Congress has already proclaimed 
that these challenges are not incompatible with law enforcement investigations,273 financial 
institutions and their customers should be able to build this procedural hook into their contracts 
explicitly.  
Since the bank-customer relationship is contractual in origin, the two parties are free to 
establish its terms and require the financial institution to take on more protective or fiduciary-like 
duties.274  Courts have recognized that a bank “may be made subject to any legal agreement 
which the depositor and the bank may make concerning it, so long as it does not injuriously 
affect the rights of innocent third parties.”275  Accordingly, courts have enforced contracts 
providing for confidentiality beyond the default standard of disclosure in other contexts, even 
when the contractual provisions conflicted with public interest.  For example, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a doctor who entered into a voluntary confidential 
agreement with his patient “was not at liberty to breach his obligation even when he felt it was in 
the public’s best interest to do so.”  The court found the doctor’s “cho[ice] to limit his ability to 
share information” dispositive in overriding the norms of disclosure.276  In holding the doctor 
liable for breach of confidentiality, the court noted the public policy favoring “the free-flow of 
                                                 
272 Pamela Davis, What to Do When the Government Calls: Advising Clients on Government Demands for Personal 
Information on Customers and Others, Speech at PLI Conference (June 2004).  
273 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) (explicitly authorizing banks to bring these challenges). 
274  Teeling v. Ind. Nat’l Bank, 436 N.E.2d 855 (Ind. App. 1982) (“[T]he relationship between a depositor and a bank 
is contractual in nature, and the parties are generally free to establish a fiduciary relationship between themselves by 
agreement.”) 
275 Sindlinger v. Dep’t Fin. Inst., 199 N.E. 715 (Ind. 1936) (“If there is no bad faith connected with the transaction, 
the character of the deposit, whether general or special, is to be determined from the contract between the depositor 
and the bank.”). 
276 Patton v. Cox, 276 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 2002).  
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information in a truth-finding process” but that an adhered party cannot voluntarily testify to 
protected information.277 
The banking context is particularly ripe for such contracting for heightened privacy 
protection because legislation foreshadows and sanctions this development.  The GLBA requires 
that financial institutions “provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the institution’s privacy 
policies” to customers.278  In drafting this requirement, Congress clearly assumed that different 
institutions would provide varying levels of protections; if only the baseline protections 
mandated by the GLBA and FRPA were permissible, then no institutional notice would be 
necessary.  Along with promoting flexibility in contracts and variety in privacy policies, the 
GLBA champions individual customers determining the level of disclosure they are willing to 
permit.  For example, the GLBA allows customers to opt out of the sharing of their information 
with unaffiliated third parties by requiring banks to provide specific notice of any proposed 
disclosures and a reasonable period of time for the opt-out to occur.  Once a customer opts out, 
“a financial institution must honor that opt-out direction as soon as is reasonably practicable after 
the opt-out is received.”279  This principle of self-determination – allowing customers to take 
charge of the flow of their person and to play a role in the decisions governing the dissemination 
of their records among an array of presented options – would translate well into context of 
contracting for pre-enforcement challenges.  
                                                 
277 Id. at 497.  However, in other contexts such as employee trade secret agreements, “courts are increasingly 
reluctant to enforce secrecy arrangements where matters of substantial concern to the public – as distinct from trade 
secrets or other legitimately confidential information – may be involved.”  McGrane v. Reader’s Digest Assoc., 822 
F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
278 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a). 
279 Division of Financial Practices, “Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information,” Federal 
Trade Commission (June 18, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/glboutline.htm; see also Swire, supra note 
48, at 1263. 
 66
B. Existing challenges to law enforcement inquiries for 
financial records 
 
All of the federal privacy-promoting statutes contain exceptions that allow customer 
records to be disclosed without customer notice when the financial institution is served with 
formal process of law.280  These exceptions are written narrowly and interpreted as such by the 
courts.281  Although courts have not typically imposed liability on banks for disclosing records in 
response to a subpoena, they have sometimes imposed penalties on banks for complying with 
less formal process.282  These cases typically get litigated because bank customers have standing 
under the Financial Right to Privacy Act when banks divulge information despite the failure of 
the requesting authority to comply with the Act’s procedural requirements.283  For example, the 
instance of a bank responding to an oral request by law enforcement officials was held to violate 
the RFPA because the bank was not permitted to disclose information except in the case of 
customer authorization, subpoena, warrant, or formal written request.284  In investigations 
concerning national security, however, customers cannot be notified that their records have been 
subpoenaed. Hence, they must rely on banks to vindicate their rights. 
                                                 
280 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8). 
281 See infra Sec. III.B; John H. Derrick, Rights and remedies of financial institution customer in relation to 
subpoena duces tecum exception to general prohibitions of state right to financial privacy statute, 43 A.L.R.4th 
1157 (1986) (“In recognition of the fact that there are instances in which the state has a legitimate interest in 
obtaining such customer records, the [federal] statutes uniformly provide for an exception allowing disclosure 
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282 E.g., Neece v. IRS, 922 F.2d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1990). 
283 Customer Challenge Provisions, 12 U.S.C. 3410 (2000) (“Within ten days of service or within fourteen days of 
mailing of a subpoena, summons, or formal written request, a customer may file a motion to quash an administrative 
summons or judicial subpoena, or an application to enjoin a Government authority from obtaining financial records 
pursuant to a formal written request, with copies served upon the Government authority.”). 
284 Anderson v. La Junta State Bank, 115 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing the narrow exceptions to 12 U.S.C. § 
3402); see also Neece, 922 F.2d at 574 (“12 USC § 3402 of the RFPA specifies the only means by which federal 
agencies can obtain an individual’s records in the possession of third party recordkeepers such as financial 
institutions.”). 
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Customers have standing to object when banks disclose records of their own volition, 
without formal process by the requesting authority.285  In less extreme cases, customers may also 
challenge disclosures that are not closely tailored to the issued subpoena.  For example, a 
Maryland state court held that a customer could seek judicial relief from unauthorized disclosure 
of his financial records which were produced in a different time and place than specified in the 
subpoena:  “The custodian cannot – without obtaining the permission of the person(s) whose 
financial records have been subpoenaed – produce those records at a different place on a 
different date.”286  Banks also have standing to bring a motion to quash a subpoena directing 
them to release customer records.287  
While customers do not have standing under the RFPA or other federal statutes to move 
to suppress evidence obtained from unauthorized or unlawful disclosures,288 they may have 
standing under state statutes.  Courts in Colorado have reasoned that because bank customers 
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in their financial records, they had standing under 
the State Constitution to challenge a subpoena issued to the bank.289  Courts in New Hampshire 
granted bank customers litigating for breach of privacy not only standing but also remedies, 
holding that suppression of records is an appropriate remedy when those records are obtained in 
                                                 
285 Id.  In response to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, customers complained that the recordkeeping requirements 
“undercut a depositor’s right to effectively challenge a third-party summons.”  The Supreme Court held that this 
scheme “works no injury on his bank” but withheld judgment on whether compulsion by subpoena of these records 
would give rise to depositor claims.  California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 US 21, 51 (1974). 
286 Bond v. Slavin, 851 A.2d 598, 608 (Md. 2003) (holding that subpoenaed records should not have been delivered 
to P’s wife instead of the court without a hearing) (citing Banks v. Conn. R. & Lighting Co., 79 Conn. 116, 118-19 
(1906).  While reaffirming that banks are compelled to release the requested records when presented with formal 
process, thesecourts have held that the disclosure is only permissible if it precisely conforms to the request.  
287 Lincoln Bank v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 827 P.2d 1314 (Okla. 1992), 
288 E.g., In re Special Investigation No. 242, 452 A.2d 1319 (Md. 1982) (holding that customer does not have 
standing to challenge a subpoena that was not directed at him, but rather to the bank to which he had voluntarily 
disclosed info). 
289 Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Colo. 1980) (citing COLO. CONST. Art. II, Sec. 7). 
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violation of a state financial privacy statute.290  State courts in Utah and Arizona have heard 
customer challenges and similarly granted motions to suppress financial records obtained 
through unlawful subpoenas on state constitutional grounds.291  In Illinois, a bank customer was 
granted standing to challenge a subpoena of her financial records because she had a right of 
privacy in her financial records under the Illinois constitution.292  The Illinois court found that 
the most appropriate means of balancing the personal interest in privacy against the public 
interest in effective investigations was using the validity of the subpoena as the test.293  
The newly created ability of banks to raise objections to FISA requests is drafted in the 
Reauthorized Patriot Act as a privilege.  However, there is precedent for the argument that this 
privilege may become a duty under certain circumstances.  For example, in the case of a 
subpoena seeking “confidential supervisory information” from the Federal Reserve Bank, 
persons seeking to compel inspection or production of records “must file a written request with 
the Board’s general counsel showing that the need for confidential information outweighs the 
                                                 
290 State v. Sheedy, 474 A.2d 1042, 1043 (N.H. 1984) (“[T]he suppression of any evidence obtained in violation of 
the Privacy Act is an appropriate remedy to vindicate the purpose behind the legislature’s passage of the Privacy 
Act.”); State v. Flynn, 464 A.2d 268, 274 (N.H. 1983) (“Therefore, we hold that the defendant has standing to 
challenge any evidence obtained directly or indirectly from a violation of his privacy rights . . . . [I]nformation 
wrongly obtained from the defendant’s accounts . . . may be suppressed.”). 
291 State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Ut. 1991) (“Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary 
consequence of police violations of article I, section 14.”) (quoting State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Ut. 1990); 
see also State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 524 (Ariz. 1984) (same holding based on parallel provision in Arizona state 
constitution). 
292 ILL. CONST. 1970, Art. I § 6 (“The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications 
by eavesdropping devices or other means.”); People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 88-89 (Ill. 1983) (“In reliance upon 
this express proscription against invasion of privacy in Illinois and influenced by the Commentary which suggests 
that this protection should be broadly applied, we are led to conclude that the Illinois State Constitution offers 
protection for the reasonable expectation of privacy which our citizens have in their bank records.”); see also 
Section 141.1(d)(1) of the Illinois Banking Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat.1979. ch. 16 1/2, par. 148.1(d)(1)) (providing state 
statutory right to privacy and notice).   
293 Jackson, 452 N.E.2d at 90 (holding that although plaintiff’s right to privacy as guaranteed by the state 
constitution gave her standing to challenge the subpoena, the validity of the subpoena outweighed her privacy 
interests); see also Rycroft v. Gaddy, 314 S.E.2d 39 (S.C. 1984) (holding that a bank did not need to “look beyond 
the face of a valid subpoena” before complying by disclosing a customer’s records). 
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need to maintain confidentiality.”294  More generally, courts in many jurisdictions have agreed 
that banks have standing to challenge subpoenas on behalf of their customers.295  These 
challenges to law enforcement inquiries in other contexts have set the stage for banks using their 
newfound power to respect financial privacy in the face of national security investigations. 
Although some courts have resisted banks who argued that their privacy polices 
prohibited them from abiding by subpoenas, these challenges have typically been struck down in 
cases where the privacy policies exempted the exact conduct being litigated.  In one such case, 
Bank of America had posted a privacy policy on its website indicating:  “If we receive a 
subpoena or similar legal process demanding release of any information about you, we will 
generally attempt to notify you (unless we believe we are prohibited from doing so).  Except as 
required by law . . . we do not share information with other parties, including government 
agencies.”296  Bank of America then received a subpoena requesting the production of customer 
records and prohibiting disclosure of the request to any third party.  The bank challenged the 
subpoena on the grounds that compliance would violate customers’ Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy.  However, the Kansas state court held that “the right to privacy statement  . . . does not 
create a privacy expectation in situation such as this where the agency is empowered to conduct 
an investigation in private.”297  The court classified the subpoena as “fall[ing] into the category 
excepted by Bank of America’s recognition that it may be prohibited from notifying customers 
                                                 
294 FDIC v. Flagship Auto Cntr., 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9468 (N.D. Oh. May 13, 2005) (citing 12 CFR § 261.22(a), 
(b) (2005)). 
295 Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 827 P.2d 1314 (Okla. 1992) (allowing a bank to bring suit for 
an injunction to enjoin the Oklahoma Tax Commission’s administrative process for the inspection of financial 
records). 
296 Brant v. Bank of America, 31 P.3d 952, 954 (Kan. 2001). 
297 Id. at 960. But see Brant, 31 P.3d at 962 (Knudson, J. dissenting) (“Although I concede a bank customer in 
Kansas has no constitutional expectation of privacy in his or her bank records, most customers surely believe their 
banker will notify them if some government agency is snooping around in their records and accounts. I do not 
believe the legislature intended to negate that entirely rational and understandable expectation by the banking 
public.”). 
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of the subpoena.”298  Hence, the court was not promulgating a blanket rule that privacy 
agreements could not be used to expand privacy protections, but rather saying that the privacy 
agreement in question as written did not determinatively expand confidentiality into the 
circumstances of the case.299  Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that when 
presented with a formal request for records by the IRS, a bank was not obliged to delay 
compliance.  However, this holding was based not only on concerns about burdening the bank, 
but also on the paucity of clear contractual language dictating how the bank should act in face of 
a subpoena.300 
Generally, the subject of a subpoena directly receives the subpoena and has an 
opportunity to challenge it by filing a motion to quash.301  However, in the case of a bank 
subpoena sealed with a nondisclosure requirement, the subject of the subpoena is not in a 
position to request a judicial hearing by filing a motion to quash. “[T]herefore, a subpoena does 
not afford the person most affected the necessary opportunity to participate in compliance and 
insure accountability.”302  Under these circumstances, banks should rise to the occasion and 
defend their customers’ privacy as Congress has newly authorized.  Although they may choose 
to honor this obligation under the present contractual regime, financial institutions may also 
exercise their rights through contractual promises to engage in substantive review and challenge 
requests when appropriate. 
C. Public policy 
 
                                                 
298 Id. 
299 However, the court does generally come out in favor of allowing private investigations. Brant, 31 P.3d at 955 (“A 
target given notice of every subpoena issued to third parties would be able to discourage the recipients from 
complying.”) (quoting and relying heavily on SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 750-51 (1984).   
300 Rush v. Maine, 387 A.2d 1127 (Me. 1978). 
301 FED. R. CIV. P.  45(c)(3)(A). 
302 Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 545. 
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In general, contracts can impose heightened obligations on banks:  “The relationship 
between a depositor and a bank is contractual in nature, and the parties are generally free to 
establish a fiduciary relationship between themselves by agreement.”303  Article 4 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC” or “the Code”) elaborates the contractual principles controlling the 
bank-customer relationship, which is governed by the provisions of the written agreement along 
with the reasonable expectations described in the UCC.  In general, the provisions provided by 
the Code serve only as a default and can be varied by agreement.  The only requirements which 
cannot be circumvented by contract are “good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care.”304  
These unalterable principles may serve as guideposts in determining whether bank-customer 
agreements obligating the bank to greater confidentiality are valid. 
Contracts requiring banks to challenge law enforcement inquiries before releasing 
customer information might brush up against public policy exclusions to contract enforceability. 
Doctrinally, “[a] promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly 
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.”305 In 
weighing public policy against enforcing a contract, courts consider “the strength of the policy as 
manifested in legislation or judicial decisions and whether refusing to enforce the contract will 
further the policy or prevent misconduct, especially if serious, deliberate, or directly linked to the 
contract.306   
                                                 
303 Teeling v. Indiana Nat’l Bank, 436 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (customer alleging that bank failed to 
provide sound investment advice). 
304 U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2005). 
305 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“[A] 
promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy 
harmed by enforcement of the agreement.”). 
306 Id. § 178(3); Richard A. Lord, The Various Foundations of Public Policy, 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:2. 
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Agreements categorically preventing banks from disclosing customer information would 
probably not be enforceable.  Contracts interfering with law enforcement have generally been 
held void against public policy.307  Courts also hesitate to punish someone for exposing the 
wrongdoing of another.  As a result, contracts preventing the disclosure of information pointing 
to the perpetrator of a crime are seldom enforced.  Courts have formalized this public policy 
exception by carving out from enforceability contracts which intend to defraud or deceive third 
parties.308  Some state courts have broadened the traditional public policy exceptions by holding 
that contracts that have the effect of preventing illicit activity from being reported are 
unenforceable even absent element of intent or knowledge.309  These carve-outs “indicate the 
law’s reluctance to enforce contracts which have the effect of injuring third persons, whether 
such possibility is anticipated or not.”310  Using a consequentialist approach, courts have 
declined to hold parties liable for breaching a contract in order to disclose suspicious activity: “A 
party bound by contract to silence, but suspecting that its silence would permit a crime to go 
undetected, would be forced to choose between breaching the contract and hoping that an actual 
crime is eventually proven, or honoring the contract while a possible crime goes unnoticed.”311 
                                                 
307 17A AM.JUR.2D CONTRACTS § 273, at 276-77 (1991) (“All agreements tending to suppress legal investigations 
concerning offenses, or agreements stifling criminal prosecutions, are illegal.”); 17A C.J.S. CONTRACTS § 234, at 
204 (1999) (“Agreements which tend to suppress legal investigation concerning criminal offenses are illegal as 
against public policy”). 
308 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1455; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 577; e.g. Lachman (“An agreement, the 
purpose of which is the commission of a civil wrong against a third party, is also illegal.”) (citing Singer Sewing 
Mach. Co. v. Escoe, 64 P.2d 855 (Okl. 1937), which typifies the type of contract entered into for the purpose of 
concealing a crime); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1980) (“[I]t is obvious that agreements to 
conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of 
public policy.”). 
309 In Lachman, the contract at issue was not entered into with the intent or knowledge of potential deceit. However, 
the court cited the more extreme case of Singer, in which a contract exchanging a promissory note for a promise to 
conceal a crime was held unenforceable, to stand for the proposition that the state “has expressed a stronger interest 
in the punishment of wrongful behavior than in the strict enforcement of contracts when the two interests collide.” 
Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Surveying Co., 457 F.2d at 853 (10th Cir. 1972). 
310 Id.; see also Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Escoe, 64 P.2d 855 (Okl. 1937); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 
1277 (10th Cir. 1969). 
311 Lachman, 457 F.2d at 854. 
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In an analogous context, courts have also voided on public policy grounds settlement 
agreements that barred the reporting of crimes to the relevant law enforcement agencies. Courts 
have even resisted enforcing settlement agreements which not explicitly conflict with the letter 
of the law if they generally prevent the revelation of suspicious activity to authorities. In refusing 
to uphold a settlement agreement that purportedly barred reporting crimes to German authorities, 
the Federal Circuit acknowledged that “there is no federal statute, treaty, or constitutional 
requirement mandating the referrals to the German law enforcement authorities.” However, the 
court applied the general presumption against enforcing contracts preventing disclosure of 
crimes in voiding the agreement: “We nonetheless conclude that the public policy interest at 
stake, the reporting of possible crimes to the authorities, is one of the highest order and is 
indisputably ‘well defined and dominant’ in the jurisprudence of contract.”312 
However, in considering whether a contract is void as against public policy, it is 
important to remember that there are competing policies at stake.313  Factors in favor of 
enforcing a contract despite a potential conflict with public policy include “(a) the parties' 
justified expectations, (b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and (c) 
any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.”314  In the case of bank 
customers, the first two factors are weighted toward enforcing privacy agreements. As Congress 
indicated in passing the Right to Financial Privacy Act, customers reasonably expect that the 
information they are required to convey to banks to participate in financial transactions will be 
                                                 
312 Fomby-Denson v. Dep’t of Army, 247 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 
Union 759, 461 U.S. 757. 766 (1983); see also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980) (historic duty of 
citizens to report crimes). 
313 Price v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 502 P.2d 522, 524 (Ariz. 1972) (balancing the competing policies of 
freedom of contract with punishment and retribution in determining that an insurance policy covering punitive 
damages was not void as against public policy). 
314 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 comment b (1979). 
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kept as confidential as is legally permissible.315  Furthermore, the forfeiture of financial privacy 
is an irreparable harm that would foreseeably result the failure to enforce these contracts.  
Some commentators have criticized relying on public policy alone to determine the 
validity of contracts as “inflexible in application, at odds with the Code language, and difficult to 
utilize in giving protection across the broad spectrum of contract relations.”316  Public policy and 
unconscionability are an imprecise means of determining when a contract should be 
unenforceable on its terms. As an alternative, courts could look to the guideposts of the Uniform 
Commercial Code’s few unalterable requirements, namely good faith.317  
In addition, a holistic conception of public policy should be multi-dimensional; the policy 
against interfering with an investigation does not operate in a vacuum, but must instead be 
cabined by policies promoting financial privacy and freedom of contract. There are strong public 
policy reasons for favoring financial privacy. Courts have invoked the public policy of respecting 
confidentiality in a multitude of contexts. For example, the Oregon state court held that an 
employee, despite the at-will nature of his employment, could not be fired for refusing to reveal 
confidential financial information, citing a public policy exception to the at-will rule.318  In the 
trade secret context, confidentiality agreements are typically enforceable except in cases when 
“public policy or the employee’s interest outweighs the interest of the employer.”319  In deciding 
                                                 
315  H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, supra note 68, at 28. 
316 Symons, supra note 70, at 240. 
317 U.C.C. § 1-304 (see text accompanying note 203); § 1-210(b)(20) (defining good faith as “honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing”); Comment 4 to § 3-103 (explaining that the good 
faith standard requires “fairness of conduct,” not merely the exercise of due care). 
318 Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, 879 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Ore. App. 1994) (“In short, there is no requirement . . . that a 
specific statute has been violated before we may conclude that a societal obligation or a public duty has been 
implicated. We must review all relevant ‘evidence’ of a particular public policy, whether that be expressed in 
constitutional and statutory provisions or in the case law of this or other jurisdictions.”). 
319 Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV 
627, 635 (1999); id. at 649 (“[D]isclosures to law enforcement agents were privileged because they were in the 
public interest.”); see also Re v. Horstmann, 1987 WL 16710, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 11. 1987) (finding no 
damages for breach of non-disclosure agreement for employee to breach confidentiality agreement to report 
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whether to enforce these agreements, states consider factors such as whether the restrictions are 
“no broader than is necessary,” “reasonably related to the protection of the information,” 
“reasonable from the standpoint of public policy,” and “factors of time and the nature of the 
business interest sought to be protected.”320  Since courts have developed and implemented 
multi-factorial tests to evaluate the validity of trade secret agreements, they should be able to 
similarly formulate an approach to analyzing which contracts require banks to challenge law 
enforcement inquiries on behalf of their customers are enforceable and under what 
circumstances. 
Furthermore, unlike the contracts which have been found void as against public policy 
because they effectively bar reporting to law enforcement authorities, the type of contract 
proposed here would merely include a procedural hook – and one which was legislatively created 
at that – to the disclosure process.321  Some courts have permitted conditional disclosure 
agreements in other contexts.  For example, the federal district court for the district of Kansas 
upheld a settlement agreement that prevented the plaintiff from voluntarily cooperating with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  In finding that the agreement was not void as 
against public policy, the court found persuasive that the provision did not prevent the plaintiff 
from testifying in response to a subpoena.322  Similarly, in this case, the proposed bank 
agreements would not bar disclosure altogether, but would only apply congressionally-
sanctioned safeguards to individual cases.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
securities violation); Baker, 117 S. Ct 1310 (1997) (providing a similar holding in the products liability context 
because state public policy favored disclosure of nonprivileged and relevant information.). 
320 Id. at 640-42. 
321 Compare Equal Empoloyment Opportunity Comm’n v. Astra, 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) (“In performing the 
balancing here, we must weigh the impact of settlement provisions that effectively bar cooperation with the EEOC 
on the enforcement of Title VII.”).  
322 Hoffman v. United Telecomm., 687 F. Supp. 1512 (D. Kan. 1988) (“[T]he settlement provision was not contrary 




 The Reauthorized Patriot Act empowers banks to protect their customers from 
unwarranted government inquiries by challenging FISA requests and NSLs.  Although the terms 
of the Act provide banks with an option rather than a directive, banks should be required to 
exercise their newly granted powers in light of the promises they foster in their contracts and 
privacy statements.  These documents, which are drafted and promulgated by banks, include 
express guarantees of confidentiality and should be construed to conform to the standards 
established by other financial privacy regulation.  Given the place of confidentiality in the bank-
customer relationship as developed by tradition and codified in federal and state legislation, 
banks should not blindly comply with government requests for records when they are permitted 
to exercise discretion in challenging FISA requests and NSLs. 
 Along with the obligations accrued under the current contractual regime, financial 
institutions can offer their customers greater privacy protection through contracts that explicitly 
obligate the institution to review government inquiries and challenge them when appropriate.  In 
light of the recent Congressional authorization of bank challenges to subpoenas of customer 
records, these contracts should be enforceable as consistent with public policy.  Furthermore, 
given the small number of FISA requests relative to the large number of bank customers, the 
average cost per customer of bank challenges will be minimal.  If banks wish to pass this cost 
along to customers who desire greater privacy protection, many customers will be willing to pay 
a small premium for the assurance that banks will more closely guard their personal information. 
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Appendix I: Market? 
 
 In Section V, this Paper addressed the enforceability of contracts wherein banks would 
promise to challenge subpoenas on behalf of their customers. In this Appendix, I will discuss 
whether the economics of such a promise would be feasible given the added cost to the bank and 
customer willingness to pay for this assurance. 
 Although case-specific data on the costs of challenging FISA requests or NSLs are not 
publicly available, extrapolation from more easily attainable data indicate that the costs, 
particularly when spread across a large number of bank customers, would be negligible.  In an 
analogous consideration of the costs of challenging requests for customer records, Congress was 
unconcerned about the price tag of the proposed reform:  When libraries challenge FISA 
requests, the litigation costs for the library’s side are funded by taxpayers who finance the 
library’s operation.  In passing S.2271, “[a] bill to clarify that individuals who receive FISA 
orders can challenge nondisclosure requirements,” Congress projected that there would be “[no] 
discernable cost” to taxpayers.323 
 When courts have awarded attorney’s fees for time spent preparing a motion to quash a 
subpoena, they have usually found awards around $5,000 to be reasonable.324  To be generous, 
let us estimate that it would cost a bank $10,000 in attorney hours to challenge any given request 
for customer records.  In 2005, there were approximately 2,000 FISA requests. Only a fraction of 
                                                 
323 S.2271, A bill to clarify that individuals who receive FISA orders can challenge nondisclosure requirements, that 
individuals who receive national security letters are not required to disclose the name of their attorney, that libraries 
are not wire or electronic communication service providers unless they provide specific services, and for other 
purposes, The Week in Congress (Mar. 10, 2006),  
http://www.theweekincongress.com/Member/MAR06_FULL/S2271PATRIOTshMAR10.htm.  
324 E.g., In re Mullins, 87 F.3d 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Panico v. Panico, 2006 WL 3703399, at *3 (Ohio App. Dec. 
14, 2006); Motion to Quash and/or Limit Subpoena Duces Tecum, In the Matter of N. Tex. Specialty Physicians, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9312/040107bcbsmotoquashorlimitsdt.pdf; Midwest Fin. Corp. v. Equity Holding 
Co., 12 P.3d 475, 476 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (“Midwest was entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred 
in responding to the Motion to Quash. The amount of fees and costs awarded ($5,422.71) was determined at a 
subsequent hearing.”). 
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these were for bank records, but to err on the side of overestimation, let us assume that one-half 
related to financial institutions.  From these rough estimations, the total cost of defending against 
all of the FISA requests would be $10 million. 
 According to the 2000 census, there are 210 million Americans over the age of 
eighteen.325 At least seventy-five percent of these individuals are estimated to have some form of 
bank account.326  Accordingly, there are at more than 150 million bank customers across the 
country. Given the estimated $10 million aggregate cost of challenging FISA requests, requiring 
banks to file motions to quash these subpoenas would only average out to less than seven cents 
per customer.  
 There is some possibility of adverse selection: customers whose behavior would make 
them more likely to be the target of government investigation may accordingly be more inclined 
to opt for the assurance that banks will challenge FISA requests on their behalf.327  However, 
even if only the one percent of customers most likely to be investigated selected to contract to 
require banks to challenge requests for their records, the total cost to banks of following through 
on the contracts would only average out to be $6.67 per customer.  Given the gravity of concern 
for financial privacy evinced in surveys of the American public,328 it seems almost certain that 
many customers would value this additional safeguard on their privacy enough to pay at least 
this much for it.329  Furthermore, the widespread concern for financial privacy suggests that these 
                                                 
325 Julie Meyer, Age: 2000, Census 2000 Brief (October 2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-
12.pdf. 
326 Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary of the Treasury, Remarks to the Enterprise Foundation’s Annual Enterprise 
Network Conference (Oct. 13, 1999), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls153.htm (estimating that “between 10 
and 20 percent of American households still do not have any type of transaction account”). 
327 For a general discussion of adverse selection, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 6-7 
(4th ed. 2005). 
328 E.g., Thorsberg, supra note 150 (discussing PC World survey). 
329 See generally Bibas, supra note 267 (discussing how prices take into account individual subjective valuations and 
reflect consumer preferences). 
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contracts would be quite popular with many bank customers, and the more people who opt into 
the system, the lower the cost per customer will be.   
 If twenty-five percent of bank customers are willing to pay a small premium to require 
banks to challenge government inquiries on their behalf, the price per customer will be only 26 
cents under the numbers and assumptions above, even assuming perfect adverse selection.  This 
suggests that even if the above analysis is off by an order of magnitude, the price per customer 
would be low enough to make the contracts to challenge requests for customer records 
economically attractive and feasible.  
 
 
 
